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RÉSUMÉ 
La part du travail dans le revenu national a connu des variations considérables 
en Europe continentale. La recherche empirique et théorique suggère que l'évolution du 
marché du travail et les imperfections de celui-ci peuvent en partie expliquer ce 
phénomène. Ce mémoire analyse de manière empirique et théorique le rôle des 
imperfections du marché du capital dans la détermination de la distribution du revenu 
national. Nous utilisons des méthodes de régression panel et de régression panel 
dynamique pour un pool incluant les principaux pays de l'OCDE. La régression tient 
compte des indicateurs du marché du capital, des facteurs provenant du marché du 
travail et des indicateurs macroéconomiques. Les résultats indiquent que 
\'intermédiation financière est négativement corrélée avec la part du travail, alors que 
l'inflation a des effets positifs. En outre, nous utilisons un modèle d'équilibre général 
simple pour retracer les effets des imperfections dans le marché financier sur les parts 
des facteurs. Les simulations du modèle soutiennent nos résultats empiriques. 
Mots clés: imperfections du marché du capital, revenu national, la part du travail, 
infla tion 
ABSTRACT 
Labor shares in national income have exhibited large variations in continental 
Europe in the last decades. Empirical and theoretical research suggests that the 
evolution of labor markets and tabor market imperfections can in part explain this 
phenomenon. This thesis analyzes empirically and theoretically the role of capital 
market imperfections in the determination of the distribution of national income. We 
use panel and dynamic panel regression methods for a pool of major OECO countries. 
The regression analysis includes variables accounting for capital markets, Jabor markets 
and macroeconomic indicators. The results indicate that financial intermediation is 
negatively correlated with labor shares, white inflation has positive effects. We further 
use a simple general equilibrium model to trace the effects of imperfections in the 
financial market on factor shares. Simulations of the model support our empirical 
findings. 
Keywords: capital market imperfections, national income, labor share, inflation 
INTRODUCTION 
Most economic morlels presume that the distribution of national income between 
labor and capital is constant over time and across countries. According ta neoclassical 
theory, the breakdown of value added national income into capital and labor shares 
should be constant, leaving short term variations to econornic fluctuations. This is the 
assumption underlying the Cobb-Douglas production function, For instance. 
However, analyzing time series data on national accounts reveals a different pic­
ture. The distribution of value added national income experiences considerable varia­
tions over time and varies heavily across countries. Specifically, European labor shares 
follow a hurnped shaped pattern with shares peaking around 1980 This can be the result 
of changing factor prices (notably the interest rate and the wage rate) J imperfections in 
labor and/or credit markets. The topic has attracted researchcrs' and politicians' inter­
est in the context oF European countries' most urgent corn mon problem: substantially 
high unemployment rates that seem to persist. Currently low labor shares in Europe are 
certainly one of the determinants of high unemployment rates. The understanding of 
this key macroeconomic variable and its determinants is t.hus substantial. An extensive 
line of literature has examined the impact of labor market imperfections on the distrib­
ution of value added national incorne and agrees that differenL labor market conditions 
in European versus Anglo-Saxon countries can in fact account for large lahor shares in 
Europe in the 1980s. 
Although the importance of financial markets has been addressed extensively in 
the literature, there have been no attempts to relate capital market developments to 
factor shares. Financial markets affect the financing conditions of firrns and might 
be an important determinant of the amount of capital that is employed. The idea is 
to analyze empirically and theoretically the link between financial intermediation and 
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factor shares. A well developed and efficient capital market encourages investment, 
facilitates the start-up of new firms and results in an efficient allocation of resources. 
On the other hand, any capital market frictions as for instance search externalities, 
strict legislation or inefficient banking systems impede an optimal use of capital. 
Financial imperfections in Europe in the 1980s may have contributed to low cap­
ital shares. Taking into consideration that firrns are able to substitute capital for labor 
in the long run, the deregulationof the banking system and other improvements in the 
financial system in Europe such as technological innovation might have encouraged firms 
to employ more capital. Bertrand et al. (2005) for ex ample analyze the effect of the 
deregulation of the French banking sector in the mid-1980s and report that the dccrcase 
of govcrnment intervention increased competition and "\Vas associated with changes in 
finn behavior, such as a lowering or average wage... ". 
Vve thus extend the research to take imo account capital markets and their im­
perfections as financial markets arc of great importance for an economy. The present 
thesis examines whether credit market imperfections in addition to labor market rigidi­
ties can contribute to cxplain movements in factor shares. To analyze the importance 
of financial intermediaries in the determinatioll of the distribution between labor and 
capital we concentra te on 15 OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, ;\)orway, Spain, the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America. The choice of coulltries is moti­
vated by the aim to distinguish between Anglo-Saxon versus European countries, data 
availability Iimits the pool to fifteen countries 
The following methodology is applied: First, we adjust labor shares to account 
for self-employment income. Second, we use panel data techniques and dynamic panel 
estimation methods on a set of variables. As there is certainly no unique reason behind 
the movement in factor shares we include variables characterizing the performance of 
the capital market, factors determining the labor market and macroeconomic indicators. 
Our regression results suggest that financial intermediation has indeed a significant neg­
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ative effect on labor shares. Second, we empirically confirm that high inflation rates in 
1980, falling thereafter, had a positive effecL on labor shares. Lastly, labor market indi­
cators, increased glob~lization and alternative variables characterizing capital markets 
yield ambiguous results. 
We further evaluate the quantitative properties of the general equilibrium model 
proposed by \Vasrner and Weil (2004) Ivith respect Lo factor shares. Enrepreneurs, work­
ers and financiers interact in imperfect capital and labor markets, where imperfections 
are implemented via search and matching frictions. The mode] traces the repercussions 
of capital market imperfections on factor shares and qualitativel} cOllforms with our 
empirical findings. Furthermore, simulations of the model en ligbten the repercussions 
of the decrease in bargaining power of workers on labor shares. Last, variations of the 
level of bargaining power of financiers lead to important variations in the labor share. 
The remaincler of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 1 provides the rele­
vant stylized facts on lauor shares and capital markets Chapter 2 reviews the literature 
devoted to this topic. Chapter 3 explains basic panel data them'y and estimation meth­
ods. Chapter 4 presents data and outlays the method used to èldj ust labor shares to 
account [or self-employment incorne. In chapter [) we specify the empirica! mode! and 
present econometric results of the regression of labor shares on a set of variables. Chap­
ter 6 introduces the model and presents simulation results. A conclusion summarizes 
the thesis and outlines areas worthy of further research, analysis and investigation. 
CHAPTER l 
THE RELEVANT STYLIZED FACTS 
This chapter presents the evolution of labor shares in European and Anglo-Saxon 
countries, respectively. Second, we highlight differences in the f1nancial system across 
countries. 
1.1 The Evolution of Labor Shares 
Taking a look at data on national accounts reveals tbat labor shares experience 
considerable variations over time. Figure Il shows that labor shares in continental 
European countries follow a humped shaped pattern. Labar sharc~s substantially in­
creased from the early 1970s up to 1980, the average Europea.n labor share increasing 
from about 50% (1970) to 55% (1979)1. This development is consistent with the rapid 
growth of wages during thal period and with wages superior to the marginal product of 
labor. Subsequently, labor shares dropped down to reach their original le"el or even fall 
below original values by the end of the 1990s This might be in part due to labor mar­
ket adjustments and firms increasing their profit rates. The observed decrease in labor 
shares goes with falling real wages below the marginal product of labor and recovering 
profil rates. In the last two decades, labor shares have been relative!y stable. 
1 LabO! shares cxclude st-,lf-p.lTlp)oyrnent and undcrcstimatc rcal labor shares Cf section 41 
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Figure 1.1 Labor Sharc~s - Continental European Countries 
On the other hand labor shares in Anglo-Saxon countries (cf. Figure 1.2) are 
relatively stable and seem to be consistent wilh standard macroeconomic themy of 
constant factor shares. There is a slightly negative tendency: ln 1970, labor shares in 
Anglo-Saxon countries averaged out at 58% compared to about 55% today. Short term 
variations around this tendency might be attributed to cyclical fluctuations. 
Australian labor shares are in between, \Vith labor shares peaking a.bout 1973 and 
abruptly falling afterwards, where the absolute level approaches Anglo-Saxon more than 
European levels. Finland and Norway also follow a hurnped shaped pattern. However, 
the patterns are less pronounced than in continental European countries. The only 
country completely falling out of the picture is Japan: labor shares peak From an extreme 
low in 1970 to a high in 1975, slowly falling afterwards. The complete picture is given 
in Figure A.l in the appendix. 
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t\!Jai n Aggregatcs) 
1.2 Capital Market Imperfections 
Nor only the banking scctor but also the financial market constitute primary con, 
ditions for a sound economic environ ment. Where access to formaI sources of finance 
is limited, new entrepreneurs rnight not be able to enter the market. Moreover, exist ­
ing firms that face financing problerns might not expand their activities or invest into 
new ones. By contrast, countries that facilitiite access to credit tend to motivate new 
investment. Numerous studies confirm that financial intermediation positively affects 
economic growth 2 
Taking a look at the performance of financial intermediation and credit market 
imperfections in the same set of countries, one remarks astonishing differences. One 
of the crucial determinants for start-ups or firms wanting to expend their activities is 
2 cf. for instance Levine (1997) 
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Table 1.1 Getting Credit 
Legal Credit Public credit Private credit 
Rights Information registry bureau 
Index Index coverage coverage 
Aust.ralia 9 5 0 100 
Austria 5 6 1.2 454 
Belgium 5 4 55.3 0 
Canada 7 6 0 100 
Denmark 7 4 0 7.7 
France 3 2 1.8 0,00 
Germany 8 6 0.6 88.2 
Italy 3 6 6.1 59.9 
Japan 6 6 0.0 61.2 
l'\etherlands 8 5 0 68.9 
Norway 6 4 0.0 100 
Spain 5 6 42.1 6.5 
Swedcn 6 5 a 100 
United Kingdom 10 6 0 762 
nited Stat.es 7 6 0 100 
Cont. Europe, average 5.5 4.88 1339 3458 
Northern Europe 6 45 a 100 
Anglo-Saxon, average 8 6 0 92 
Source: World Bank; Doing Business - comparing business regulation 
the access to credit. The International Finance Corporation (the private sector arm of 
the WoTld Bank Group) col1eds data on the economic determinants of Doing Business. 
According to the indices comprised in the data set Getting C7edit, financial conditions 
in Europe are less developcd than in Northern America. The Icgal rights index, w hich 
rneasures the degree to which laws facilitate banking, France only rates three whereas 
Canada and the Unit.ed States both rate seven on a scale of one to ten. The same applies 
to the credit information index, \vhich measures rules affect.ing the scope, access and 
quality of credit information: France has the lowest EuropeaIt'itandards (two) whereas 
information is relatively more accessible in the United St.ates or Canada (six). The 
indicators are surnmarized in Table 1.2. 
Financial conditions have been substantially changing within our horizon of in­
terest. Not only the United States but also European countries have undergone dereg­
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ulation of the banking system. These changing financial conditions are likely to have 
affected the financing activities and the economic performance of firrns. Berg et al 
(1992) for instance analyze productivity growth in Norway during the dcreguJation of 
the banking system (1980-89) and find that productivity fell prior to the period expe­
riencing deregulation but grew rapidly when deregulation took place. 
Changing financial conditions affect the rent splitting of firms. Black and Strahan 
(2001) for instance analyze the effects of the deregulation of the banking scctor in the 
United States on the labor market and find that "rents were shared with labor when 
banking competition was limited by regulation" and that, due to higher competition 
"the average compensation [... ] fell after states dereguJated." On the theoretical side of 
the ]iterature, Perotti and Spier (1993) find that firms have incentives to use high debt 
as a bargaining tool: relying on debt financing instead of equity financing, firms may 
convincingly threaten unions to lower wages in the light of the need to pay off their 
debts. Similarly, Wasmer and Weil (2003) argue that higher repayments of the finTI to 
the financier decrease the wage. The higher the interest payments to the financier, the 
lower the total surplus that is split bctween workers and employers and the lower the 
remuneration of the v,:orker. 
We develop these arguments to see whether financial intermediation, as a logical 
consequence, is likely to affect labor shares. The importance of the latter for the over­
al] performance of the economy suggests rhat the inclusion of credit markets into the 
analysis is a meaningful extension of current research. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter outlines the wide literature that has addressed the question why 
European labor shares peaked in the SOs. Mostly, labor market institutions are claimed 
to be at the origin. vVe further take a look at the literature that analyzes financial 
markets. 
The first to remark the dramatic mavements in factor shares in value added 
national incarne was Oliver Blanchard (1997). He analyses factor sllares, factor priees 
and relative shares and priees. He proposes arguments that can accounC for the obsened 
developments, notably the interplay of adverse labor dernand and labor supply shacks. 
Accordingly, the increase in European labor shares in the 1970s can be explained as a 
consequence of increasing wages with respect to the marginal productivity of labor (Iabor 
supply shock). Supply shocks, as for instance the oil price shocks and the slowdown in 
total factor productivity growth initiated European policy to strengthen the position of 
employees in order to protect their incorne. 
In the 19S0s however, firms started to adjust to increased labor costs by increasing 
capital shares, lowering \vages, slowly recovering and stabilizing profits. The 1980s can 
thus be characterized by labor demand shocks, such as the dccrease of the real wage 
offered by firrns Chat lead to increased capital shares in Europe. Blanchard proposes 
three potential sources for the increase in capital shares: first, there might be adjustment 
lags to changes in factor priees: consequently, the increase in capital shares can be 
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interpreted as Cl. delayed reaction to high real wages. Second, firms' profits seem ta 
have increased with respect ta workers' remuneration, which might be a resultof firms 
increasing mark-ups. Lastly, technological progress in favor of capital might have lead 
ta increased capi tal shares. 
Furthermore, Blanchard decomposes factor share movements into factor priee and 
factor quantity movements. He shows that already in the 1970s, capital ta labor ratios 
have been increasing. Decreasing profit rates during that perioJ go with the increase in 
labor shares. Subsequently, profit rates recovered and capital ta labor ratios continued 
to increase, resulting in increasing capital shares during the 1980s. :\s for Anglo-Saxon 
countries, Blanchard argues that these countries have been subject ta weaker labor 
demand and supply shocks, i.e. a smaller increase of the real wage during the 1970s 
and weaker reactions from labor market institutions, leaving factor shan~s more or less 
stable over tilDe. 
Most of the research that follows Blanchard's text attempting ta explain movc­
ments in factor shares concentra tes on the evolution of labor markets and labor shares 
in national income. Caballero and Hammour (1997) for inst.ance analyze capital to 
labor ratios in European countries. They argue that the creation of various labor pro­
tecting institutions in the early 1970s, i.e. the social security system, minimum wage 
regulations and centralized unions, contributed to increasillg labor shares. The first 
oil priee shock in 1973 further motivated the poli tics of job protection. According to 
their theory, the subsequent fall of labor shares is due to substitution of capital for 
labor. This a.rgument is based on a theoretical frarnework that breaks the hypothesis 
of a constant elasticity of substitution between capital and labor equal to one. Instead, 
they provide convincing evidence of a lcvel of elasticity inferior to one in the short run. 
A low elasticity of substitution implies that firms respond to an increase in a relative 
factor priee with a less than proportional reduct.ion of that factor. This entails that a 
relative priee increase augments the part of this respective factor in national incarne. 
A low elasticity of substitution can thus explain that the wage push in the 19705 \Vas 
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accompanied by an increase in labor shares. The authors argue that, in the long run, 
the elasticity of substitution surpasses unit}', implying greater flexibility. Firms only 
started to adjust to increased labor costs towards 1979: Labor input was reduced and 
firms employed more and more capital. The real wage adjusted backwards to reach a 
level close to or even below marginal productivity of labor and capital shares increased. 
Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) extend the ',.vork in both empirical and theoretical 
terms. They show that movements in the labor share can be partially attributed to 
movements along the "share-capital schedule", i.e. the theoretical constant relationship 
between capital to output ratios and labor shares1 Examples of movements along this 
curve are changes in factor priees such as wage pushes and changes in the real rate of 
interest. On thc other hand, factors such as mark-ups increase priees above marginal 
costs. Labor adjustment costs and changes in workers' bargaining power result in shifts 
of the share-capi tal sched ule which consequently affects labor shares. Em pirical res ults 
based on a panel of 14 OECD countries affirm the relationship bctween labor shares and 
the share-capital schedule. More importantly, labor adjustment costs anJ changes in 
workers' bargaining power are significant determinants of labor sbares. They concluJe 
that "discrepancies between the marginal product of labor and the rcal wage" can 
account for departures from the relationship betwcen labor shares and the capital to 
output ratio and can thus explain rising labor shares in Europe. 
Other research has focused on the development of social protection systems. La­
bor compensation in national accounts consists of wages and salaries. Supplements to 
v.rages and salaries such as contributions to social security, pensions are also included in 
labor compensation, those paid by employees and those paid by employers. The percent­
age of total social contributions has been varying considerably. Consider for instance 
increased contributions to unemployment insurance in continental Europe following the 
increase in unemployment rates. Consequently, they might play an important raIe in the 
1 This rclationship is constant as long as thcre are no deviations such as mark-up pricing. 
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determination of labor shares Poterba (1998) for instance points out that labor shares 
in the United States have been stable, while the part of wages and salaries has been 
continuously decreasing, irnplying increasing non-wage benefits such as contributions 
to health insurance and pension funds. In the sarne line of reasoning, taxation of firrn 
profits are accounted for in capital shares and consequently influence the distribution 
between labor and capitaL Timbeau (2000) for instance rernarks that the part of taxa­
tion in value added national incorne (the sum of taxes on production and on corporate 
incorne) in France has been increasing 2.9 percentage points frorn 1981 to 2000 
Finally, some researchers dou bt in the way parts of national revenue are mea­
sured They propose alternative adjustrnents which seem to smoüth and extenuate the 
observed evolutions as exposed by Blanchard. Askenazy (2003) for instance compares 
the distribution of value added national incorne in France and the United States and 
makes five adjustrnents tü the data: first, he accounts for other fürrns of rernunera­
tion apart from wages and salaries, for instance the participation of employees in firms' 
surplus. Second, he adjusts labor shares to include an imputed self-employed income. 
Third, he takes into account the recent increase in part time \Vork by using data on "full 
time equivalent" -employment 2 Fourth, he remarks that "Financial Intermediation In­
directly Measured" (FISIM):l is "falsely" excluded from value added national income 
published by the OECD. Lasl, he accounts for the fact that the state is far more involved 
in economic activity in France compared to the United States by limiting the analysis 
to the pri\'ate sector. Adjusting the computation of labor shares to these cited factors 
he cames to the conclusion that the composition of national income is not that different 
in France and the United States. His analysis is however limited to certain industries, 
excluding the public sector (i.e. education, health, state) and agriculture. 
2The OECD refcrs ta the nurnber of ail full- and parl-tiruc workers by "Total employment", 
'l'hile "Total employmcnt . Full-time cquivalent" is defined as total hours worked divided by average 
annuaJ hours worked in full-lime jobs. 
3FISIM is an indirect mcasure of the value of financial intcrmediation services provided but for 
which fina.ncial institutions do not charge cxplicitly. Source: OECD glossa.ry. 
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On the other hand, there is a considerable body of literature relating to the 
importance of nnancial markets in the context of economic development. The initiator of 
this concept was Goldsmith (1969). He was the first to establish a link between financial 
intermediaries and economic growth, and in fact demonstrated a high correlation. King 
and Levine (1993) provide convincing empirical proof of the positive effect of financial 
intermediation on economic development. Levine (1997) gives an excellent overview of 
the theoretical and empirical work that has been dedicated to this question and outlays 
the primary functions of financial intermediaries. He uses the database on indicators 
of financial market performance published by the World Bank, including measures of 
the activity, the composition and the efficiency of the banking sector and the stock 
market, for his empirical analysis. Regression results strongly support t.he idea that 
financial development fosters economic growth. He also uddresses the question whether 
the distinction between "bank-based" and "market-based" economies can account for 
differences in economic progress. According to his assessment, this distinction does 
not play a major l'ole. Finally, Levine analyses "third factors", i.e. the country's 
legal system, political institutions as potential reasons for different developments of the 
financial system. 
On the theoretical sphere of the literature our research is directly linkcd ta the 
work of Wasmer and \Neil (2004). The authors build a general equilibrium model 
including frictions in both credit and labor markets. Entrepreneurs and financiers meet 
in the credit market and bargain over the financial contract. Then, entrepreneurs search 
for a worker and bargain over the wage contract. Both search procedures are subject. 
to search and matching frictions. Credit market frictions not only affect the credit 
market but turn out to influence the labor market as weIl. The model is thllS of great 
importance to our thesis as we extend it to demonstrate repercllssions of credit market 
imperfections on factor shares. 
Similarly, Perotti and Spier (1993) build a model which traces the interrelation 
between the capital structure of a firm and wage contracts. The allthors develop the 
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idea that firms might use the capital structure as an effective bargaining tool in the 
determination of the wage: firms exchange debt for equity when current profits are 
10\\1, but prospects on future earnings are hiL,h, arguing that investment is necessary to 
pay future wages. Firms might then convincingly t.hreaten that they wiJl not invest in 
new projects unless the union agrees to reduce wages. The model enlightens that "debt­
for-equity exchanges serve t.wo purposes: v.'age concessions will be (i) more frequent and 
(ii) of greater magnitude." The papel' is thus of interest to our analysis as it models the 
repercussions of financial structure on wages. It might serve as a basis to develop the 
link between finilncial structure and labor shares. 
To sum up, most of the literature that addresses movements in factor income 
shares has focused upon labor markets. Labor market rigidities and real wage develop­
ments seem indeed to explain why labor shares have been increasing in Europe during 
the 1970s. \VhiJe there seems to be a consensus on the reasons for increasing labor shares 
in continental Europe, attempts to explain the following decrease are !css convincing. 
Blanchard for instance argues that increased mark-ups lead ta increasing capital shares. 
However, increased competition due to thriving international trade is more likely ta 
have forced firms to decrease mark-ups. Second, Blanchard gives no reason why l>i­
ased technological change should have been different in Europe compared ta the United 
States. The argument of an elasticit.y of substitution inferior to one in the short l'un 
and superior to one in the long l'un as observed by Caballero and Hammour is able 
ta explain the increase and subsequent decrease in labor shares. However, ie does not 
explain why labor shares in Europe fell below 1970 levels. Other rescarchers prefer ta 
avaid the enigma by limiting their analysis to certain sectors of the econorny. 
CHAPTERIII 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter introd uces t he basics of panel data theury 'yVe present the theoretical 
background of different estimation methods that we will use in the regression analysis, 
narnely the pooled estimator, the ranclom effects and the fixed cffects estimator and 
dynamic panel estimators. 
3.1 The Panel Data Model 
To estimate the effect of fi nancial intermediation and other variables on the labor 
share, we use panel data techniques. The reasons are twofold: First., on!y time series 
data on one country alone will result in poor estimates as the sample size is relatively 
small (data horizon of 36 years). Similarly, cross section estimation is c1early no sensible 
alternative with data being available for 15 cross sections, i.e. 15 countries only. Using 
panel data techniques has the advantage of providing a ri cher data source. 
Second, panel data techniques allow to control for unobserved time-invariant het­
erogeneity in cross-sectional models. Even after controlling for a number of variables, 
we have to assume that labor shares in each country are determined by factors unknown 
or immeasurable. The advantage of panel data techniques is that the omitted variable 
problem can be eliminated by combining the time series and cross-sectional dimensions. 
In other words, it is possible to consistently estimate regression coefficients even though 
the explanatory variR.hles might be correlated with unobserved, time constant variables 
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specific to each cross section. 
The model to be estimated can be represellted as 
(3.1) 
Yit is the dependent variable for cross section unit i at time t where i = 1,2, ... , M 
and t = 1,2, .. " T. Xi( is a lx K vector containing K observable variables that change 
across i and t and (3 is the K x 1 vector of the coefficients to be estimateci, Ci( is the 
composite error. ci( can be split up into two parts: cü = Ci + T)it. The Ci are called 
individual effeets which denote the variation t hat is specifie to cross section i, i.e there 
is variation across cross sections but not across time, with E(Ci) = 0 lt is furthermore 
assumed that there is no correlation between the individual effects for two different 
cross sections, i.e. E( Ciej) = 0 for i i- j, and that there is (for now) no cross section 
heteroskedasticity, i.e. E(CiCi) = a~. T)ü represent the idiosyncralir: errors that change 
across i and t. The erraI' terms T),t are assumed ta be uncorrelated \Vith the Xi( and 
E(T)it) = O. Lastly, for now the idiosyncratic errors are assumed to have a time invariant 
unconditional variance. i.e. E(T)TJ = a~, t = l, "') T and to be serially uncorrelated, 
i.e. E(T)itT)iJ = 0, s i- t. The individual effects are uncorrelated \""ith the idiosyncratic 
errors, i.e. E(CiT)is) = o. 
One can view the data as a set of cross-section specifie regressions so that we have 
A1 cross-sectional equations each \Vith T observations stackecl on top of one another. 
Let Yi denote a vector of T observations for cross section i, i.e. 
Yi] Xl X ,2]il 
Yi2 Xl2 X;2Yi Sirnilarly, let X i = and ci 
Y;T X;T X;T xli EiT 
be the T x K 'vector of explanatory va.riables and the T x 1 vector of the disturbance 
terrn, respectively. Then the stacked form simply organizes data for aIl cross sections 
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on top of each other: 
y= , X= and é = , where Y is of order MT x 1. X 
YM XlvI ê!VI 
of order MT x K and é of order iV/T x 1. The shortened version of the linear regression 
model can sim ply be expressed as Y = Xf3 + é. 
Panels can be balanced, i.e. the number of observation is the same for ail cross 
sections (Ti = TV 'il, or unbalanced, i.e. Ti i= T Vi. If li is exogenous, the fact that 
the panel is unbalanced does not pose any problcms on the estimation procedure. If Ti 
is endogenous, unbalanced estimation can cause probJems. Ou r panel is unbalanced as 
not 8.11 variables are available from 1970 onwards for al! countrics. lIowever, as we can 
assume that the reason for sorne data starting in 1976 only is not systematically related 
to labor shares, using the subsample has no serious cconometric consequences.] 
3.2 Estimation Methods 
This section presents the most commonly applied estimation methods. Besicles 
the pooled estimatoT, the mndom effects method is used whenever the individual efr~cts 
are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and the fixed effecls estimatoT in the 
presence of correlation bctween the two. Last, the generalized method of moments is 
used to estimate dynamic panel models. 
3.2.1 The Pooled Estimator 
The pooled estimator is a first straightforward way to estimate panel data models. 
Because it rests upon strong assumptions which are unlikely to hold in our setting, it 
is of jitt.le interest to the present setting. However, it presents a convenient way to 
introduce the logic of panel estimators because it is simple and serves as a starting point. 
1er Wooldridgc (2001), p. 552 
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Consequently, its assumptions can be relaxed one by one leading to more sophisticated 
estimators. 
Assume that the composite error term E is uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variable, tbat is 
(3.2) 
Wben the composiie error term can be assumed to be ii.d. across time and cross sections, 
i.e. 
(3.3) 
estimation simply reduces to applying ordinary least squares (OLS) to the stacked data, 
Le. 
{3POOL = (X/Xr 1 (X/Y) . (3.4) 
Because of 32 OLS will be unbiased. tvloreover, 3.4 will result in efficient estimates. 
However, assumption 3.3 is unlikely to hold in our setting as we are dealing with 
different countries over time. The composite error tenn E,t is likely ta be heterogenous 
because of different cross section terms Ci and the time dimension gives rise to questions 
about autocorrelation in the error term. To deal with these problems the literature 
proposed the random effects and the fixed effects estimation. The first treats Ci as 
a random variable and assumes that Ci is uncorrelated with the observed explanatory 
variables Xi(. The latter allows for correlation of the unobserved effect with the error 
term where the cross specific effects Ci are coefficients to be estimated in the regression. 
In the following the two methods are explained. 
3.2.2 The Random Effects Method 
A first step to bring us doser to an appropriate estimator for the regression of 
labor shares on a set of variables is to relax assumption 3.3. The pooled estimator 
19 
under assumption 3.3 basically ignores the panel structure of the data set. The decom­
position of the error term [il = Ci + 'l7 t l allows to be more specific about the structure 
of the variance covariance matrix of the error term. This is what the random effects 
estimation consists in: it applies a feasible generalized squares method that takes into 
account the particular structure of the error term [il. In the presence of errors that 
violate assumption 33 but under assumptiori 3.2 the random effccts method is thus 
more efficient than the OLS pooled estimation method whieh ignores seriaI correlation 
in the composite error term 2 What is more, the random effects rnethod is of interest 
to the present study because j t. allows to deal wi t h the presence heteroskedastic errors 
or seriaI correlation in the idiosyncratic error term. 
The important assumption underlying the random effects in cont.rast to the fixed 
effects estimator is that the cross section specific effects Ci are uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables (i.e. assumption 3.2 still holds). This rnethod might be applied 
to panel data on household consumption for instance, where unknown household cllar­
acteristics do Ilot systematically vary with explanatory variables; e.g. income. The 
random effect method treats the cross section specific effects as random variables: the 
cross section effects Ct are si mply seen as a pan of the error term. The explanatory 
variable is assumed to be strictly exogenous, i.e. 
(3.5) 
Under the specifie assumptions about the idiosyncratic error terms (cf. page 
16) one can calculate the elements of the variance-covariance matrix of the composi te 
error term Eil : E(E?tl = E [(Ci + 'l7iYJ = E(c;) + 2E(Ci'l7itl-i- E('I7Ttl = a~ + a~ for ail 
s = t and E(E:it[tsl = a~ for al\ s t t. The T x T variance covariance matrix for cross 
2 cL Johnston and DiNardo (1997), p. 391 
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section i takes thus the form L.:' = E(f,f;) = . The 
a 
2 
c' 
MT x Mt variance covariance matrix for the stacked form is thus 
L.: 0 0 
0 L.: 
st = lM @ L = E(ff') = 
0 
0 0 E 
Wooldridge (2002) shows how the elements a~ and a~ can be consistently es­
tirnated by â~ and â;. Assuming that the variance matrix of f û c:onditional on Xl 
is consLant the estimated variance-covariance matrix E can be used to apply feasible 
generalized least squares (FGLS): 
(3.6) 
The random effects FGLS estimator is consistent and efficient. when the exogeneity 
assumption holds. 
Two more extensions will be of use in our analysis: The random effects method 
(as well as the fixed effects method) allows to control for correlation patterns between 
the idiosyncratic residuals, i.e. E(r;;J i a;, t = 1, '" T. \\Te will considcr the two most 
probable ones for our analysis: cross-section specific heteroskedastic:ity and period spe­
cific heteroskedasticity. ln our application residuals are likely vary across cross section, 
i.e. across countries. Cross-section specific heteroskedasticity allows for a different resid­
ual variance for each cross section. It can be formally expressed as E(Tlit'TJûIXl' Ci) = a; 
and E(TlitT/JsIXj,Ci) = 0 for any s,t,],i, 5 i t, i i j, or, using matrix formulation 
E('TJiTliIXi, Ci) = a;]y. The FGLS procedure first performs a preliminary estimation to 
obtain cross-section specific residual vectors and secondly uses these residuals to farm 
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estimates of the cross-specific variances. Feasible GLS then uses these estimates in 
a weighted least squares. Second, an alternative correlation pattern allows for period 
specific heteroskedasticity \vhich assumes that the residuals vary with the Lime peri­
ods. This coefficient covariance method can be expressed as E(SitéjtlXt> C,.) = O"Z and 
E(éité)sIX;;c1) = 0 for any s,t,j,i, s =1= t. Feasible GLS procedure is similar to that 
for cross-section specific heteroskedasticity. Knowing that labor shares in Europe show 
a very similar pattern and that their economies were exposed to similar shocks, this 
assumption might be of interest. The empirical analysis will consider both coefficient 
covariance methods. 
3.2.3 The Fixed Effects Method 
The random effects method is still not satisfactory to our cross country analysis 
because the exogeneity assumption 3.2 seems too restrictive. The cross section terms 
Ci capture any country specific effects that are unknown or imllleasurable to the econo­
rnetrician. An example of these tirne constant variables in our application are charac­
teristics of the labor market protection legislation which vary heavily across countries 
but are approximately time invariant. We have to be aware of the fact that the cross 
specific effects C, are likely to be correlated with the explanatory variables, that is 3.2 
does not hold because it demands that not only the idiosyncratic errors 77!l but also 
the cross section specifie errors Ci are uncorrelated \Vith the explanatory variables, i.e. 
E(X:t77it) = 0 and E(X:tCt) = o. 
This is why we now turn to the fixed effeet method: the key difference of fixed 
effects method with respect to the random effects method is that it does not restrict 
correlation between the unobserved effeet and the error tenD, i.e. E(X~têit) =1= O. The 
Ci are thus allowed to be a function of X i .3 This is one of the major advantages of 
the fixed effects estimator: It allows to consistently estimate regression coefficients even 
though the explanatory variables might be correlated \vith unobserved, time constant 
:1 cf. Wooldridge (2002) p. 2G6 
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variable c,. Contrary to sim pie time series or cross section analysis w here the omission 
of a relevant variable results in biased estimates, the panel estimation techniques allow 
for reliable regression results. Whenever assumption 3.2 fails to hold, the random effects 
estirnator will be biased and the fixed effects estimator should be used. 4 Graphically, 
the fixed effects estimator takes into account the "individuality" of each country by 
letting the intercept vary for each country but still assuming that the slope coefficients 
are constant across countries. 
As in the random effects rnodel, the explanatory variable is assumed to be strictly 
exogenous, i.e. assumption 3.5 still holds The idea of the fixed eH·ects rnethod is to 
use the tüne dimension of the data to eliminate the time constant variable Ci. There 
are several methods to do so. The fixed efJect transformation or within transfoTTnation:) 
involves removing cross-section means from the dependent variable and cxogenOllS re­
gressors, and then performing the spccified regression on the "dernean". AIgebraically, 
this can be seen as follows. Averaging data for each cross scction ove!' t = 1,2, ... ,T 
gi \les the cross section eq uation 
(3.7) 
Second, subtracting the cross section equrl.tion 3.7 from the original equation 3.1 
gives 
(3.8) 
1 cf. Johnston and DiNaro, p. 396 
°cL Wooldridge (2002) p. 26ï 
6Note that WiLh il large number of cross sections one could simply use equacion 3.7 to escimate B. 
This estimator is referrcd Co the between estimator, which uses only variation between the cross section 
observations. However, this estimator does not rnake use of the time dimension of the dala and is chus 
noL efficient 
23 
where the constant cross section tenn drops out. This time demeancd equation can now 
be estimated by pooled OLS the fixed effect estimator is the OLS estimator from the 
regression of Yii - Yi on X it - X,: 
M ) -1 ( M )i3 FE ,OLS = t; [(Xit - X,)(X,t - X;)] ~ [(Xit - Xd(î~i - Yi)] (3.9)( 
The condition for OL8 to be consistent is the strict exogeneity condition 3.5. 
This condition for equation 3.8 translates into E [(Xii - X,)'(TJ'i - TJi)] = O. From as­
surnption 3.5 we know that Xit is uncorrelatcd \-vith 77it and thus (Xit - XJ will be 
uncorrelated with (TJit - TJ;) and OLS will he consistent. 1\1oreover, one can show that 
under assurnption 3.5 the fixed effect estimator is unbiased. 7 As long as the idiosyn­
cratic error term is time invariant and homoscedastic, i.e. E(1]iTJ,J,·'(" Ci) = (J~Ir, t.he 
fixed estimator will be efficient. However, in practice and specifically in our analysis 
this assumption might be too restrictive as the d'rors might be serially correlated. The 
estimation procedure applicd in these cases is fcasible generalized lcast squares (FGLS). 
\!I/e therefore consider again the residual matrix. Let ~ be the \'ariance-covariance rna­
trix for the fixed effect transformation model 3.8, i.e. ~ = E [(1]it - TJ,)(TJ,t - TJ;)'] . The 
fixed effccts procedure first consiclers simple fixed effects estimation to obtain cross­
section specific residual vectors TJ-:=;, = (Yii - Yi) - (X it - X i )!3, i = 1,2, ... , M. In 
the second step, these residuals arc used to estimate thc cross-specifie variances. A 
consistent estimator of ~ is given by Ê = !~ L~';;"l TJ~i TJ~,l Feasible GLS can 
then he performed using the estimated mat.rix ~: 
Assuming full rank and 35, the estirnator 3.10 will be consistent. 
7 ~ec \~!ooldridgc (2002) p. 268 for details 
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The Dummy Variable Regresswn 
\~fhen 3.2 does not hold there is an alternative representation of the model 3.1 
which involves the representation of country specific effects with the help of country 
durnmy variables. The regression thus includes 1\1 dummy variables, say Dm[, Dm2, 
... , Dm/V[. These dummy variables far each cross section Dmi take the value l for m = i 
and Ootherwise. That is, the dummy variable is 1 whenever the observatioll belongs lo 
country i. The model can then be expressed as Yi! = c1Dmj + C2Dm2 + .. ' + CM DïT/,:\I[ + 
X it /3 + fit! or, more concise!y 
Y = X{3 + Dc + 'Tl, (3.11) 
where D = lM (2:nT, where iT is an T x 1 veetor of ones and c is the "ectar of individual 
effects. 
Again, to dispose of the I1xed effects, data is transformed bcfore applying least 
squares: differencing 3.11 across time gives 6Y = 6X/3 + 6E, where the dumrny vari­
ables drop out because they are time invariant. Whereas assumption 3.2 does not holei 
for the original data, il holds for the transforrned data: 6X is orthogonal to 6E, ie. 
E(6X'6E) = 0, so that OLS can be applied 8 The durnrny variable estirnator can he 
shown to be identical to the fi.xed effect estimator. Therefore 3.11 is just another rep­
resentation of the fixed effect equation \'vhich is why the fi.xed effect estimator is also 
called the least squares d ummy variable estimator. 
One should note that, although the dummy variable method al10ws obtaining 
estirnates of the fi.xed effects Ci 9 there is no sensible interpretation: the method described 
above does not yield consistent estirnates. Under the asymptotic theory that 1\1 --> 00 
the number of fixed coefficients Ci tends to infinity as weIl. However, the primary interest 
lies in consistently estirnating the coefficients in /3, not the fixed effects. 
8 cf. Johnston and OiNaro, p. 396 
9 SCC Woolrlridge (2002) p. 273 for dctails 
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3.2.4 Dynamic Panel l\1odels 
The fixed effects estimator seems to reliably apply to our data. To test the robust­
ness we aJso include dynamic panel data estimators as alternative estimation methods, 
namely the Arellano-Bover (1995) and the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator. These es­
timators are of val ue to our analysis for several reasons. Fi l'st, the pl'oposed l11cthods 
do not requil'e the strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables (cf. assumption 3.5) so 
that we might include GDP growth into the explanatory variables which, because of en­
dogeneity, can onl)' be used as an instrument in the FE regression. Arellano and Honoré 
(2001) point out that the assumption of strict exogeneity is rnisleading in bme series 
analysis where the distinction between predetermined and strictly exogenous variables 
is crucial. Second, the Arellano-Bovel' estirnator allows to consistently estimate 110n­
stationary data in levels as opposed to first difference Last, \Vooldridge (2001) argues 
that the "optimal procedure" is a generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure 
because it uses all available instruments and is thus efficient with respect to the FGLS 
estimator which, even when including instrumental variables (IV), onl)' uses a constant 
dimension of lYs across t. 
The general model can be expressed as 
p 
Yit = L akYi(t-k) + X it {3 + Ct + 7]iL (3.12) 
k=l 
where Y;L is the dependent variable, Ct is again the cross specific effect and 7]tl the 
residuals, X iL are the explanatory variables which may now contain lagged explanatory 
variables. The number of cross sections is again AI, the nurnber of time series is l'ed uced 
,by the number of maximallags q, i.e. t = q+ 1, ... , T. The regression thus includes lagged 
dependent (and independem) variables. Because of the lagged dependent variables OLS 
will be inconsistent for small values of T. One of the leading estimation methods to 
address this problem is the Arellano-Bond linear estimator. This method combines a 
procedure to remove cross specifie effects (i.e diflerencing) with a GMM estimation 
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including instrumenta! variables. 
Equation 3.12 can be rewritten more compactly for each cross section as 
(3.13) 
where Yi are thc stackcd T-p values of Yit for cross section i, l.i is a T-p vector of 
ones, <5 is the vector of coefficients and 'Vi includes bath lagged depenclent variables and 
explanatory variables, ie. l'Vi = (Y,t-l,Yit-2, ... ,YiI-I',X,t). The estimator proposed by 
Arellano and Honoré (1991) transforms data by differencing to climinate cross specinc 
Y,(2+p) - Y,(1+p) 
Yi(3+p) - Y,(2+p)
effects: Yt = . Denning Wt and ri; similarly, the model reduces 
Y;(T) - Y,(T-I) 
t.o ~. = W/o + ri;· 
However, this model cannat be estimated by OLS because t.he transformcd errors 
are correlated with the transformed dependent variable. The Gf\,HvI estimator helps out 
in using a set of moment conditions E(Z;Yil = 0 where Z.i are the instrumental yariables. 
The Arellano-Bond estimator exploit the fact that the transformed data is uncorrelated 
\Vith lagged dependent variables, i.e E('riit 1 Y,(t-l)) = 0. 10 Whereas Y,t is correlated 
with the composite error term, the level variable Yt - 2 can thcn be used as an instrument 
for Yi~ because it is uncorrelated with 'ri;! : E(Y,(t_2)'riit) = 0 or E [Y,(t-2) (Y,; - T;f!i:O)] = 
O. The corresponding sample moments are then ,~ L;~l Y;(t-2)(Yi ; - W i:<5) = 0 for 
t = 3, .. .T. Il Assuming that the X,t are strictly exogenous, the transformed data Xit = 
Xi(t+l+p) - Xi(t+p) serve as instruments for themselves. 
Consider for instance the model 3.12 for one lag of the dependent variable, i.e. 
IUcr. Arcllano and Honoré (2001) p. 3242. 
Il cr Arcllano and Bond (1991). 
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p = 1: Yit = a1YiU - 1) + X,il3 + Ci + 71ù, or, the transformed version Y,; = aIYi(t_l) + 
X7J3 + 71ft' where the cross section terms drop out. The G!vIM estimator makes use 
of the increasing numberof valid instruments for later observations. For the "nrst" 
equation )/,3 = aY;i + 71.~3 only the first observation Yil is a valid instrument, for the 
second eq uation Y,~ = a)/,3 + 7);4' the first two observations Yll and Y,2 can be uscd as 
instruments, etc The instrument. matrix Zi is thus 
YiJ 0 0 0 X',3 
0 Yil Y,2 0 X;4 J 2Zi= 
0 0 0 Yil Y,2 r;(T-p+l) X,']" 
Given the rnatrix of instrumental variables Zi; the Arellano-Bond estimator of (5 
is given by 
(3.14) 
U nder homoscedastic errors, the opti mal choice of A is A = (L:~ 1 Z: HZi) - 1 ; 
where H is the covariance matrix of the differenced residuals Tlil" This estimator is 
referred to by the one-step Arellano-Bond estimator. Consequently, cstirnated errors 
can be obtained from the one step estimatar b ta form a rabust estimator making use of 
an estirnated variance-covariance matrix which is referrcd to as the two-step Arcllano 
Bond estimator. 
An alternative transformation of the data to first differencing invalves the com­
putation of orthogonal deviations (AreJJana and Bovel', 1995). Orthogonal deviatians 
express each observation as the deviation from the average of future observations in the 
sample for the same crass section, and weight each deviation to standardize the vari­
12 er. Stata (2005) 
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ance. 13 In fact, the orthogonal deviations procedure is equivalent to first differencing 
to get rid of fixed effects, and then using GLS to e!iminate first degree autocorrela­
tion re~ulting from first differencing (Arellano and Honoré, 2001). We will not go into 
detail as the algebra is quite cornplex and intuition resembles basically the difference 
transformation estimation (see Greene, 2003, p. 310 for details). 
There are however two major advantagcs of this transformation: First. autocor­
relation between transformed errors will be absent if it is absent among the original 
errors. Second, orthogonal deviations allows to estirnate the equation in levels, using 
variables in first differences as instruments as opposed to estimation in first difference 
using level instruments. The estimator 3.14, where the asterisk now represent trans­
formed data using orthogonal differences, remains valid for nonstationary data as long 
as one assumes 
Cov(yt, TI;) = 0, (t = 2, ... ,T), (3.15) 
which requires "that the process started in the distant past". H Arellano and Bovel' 
(1995) point out that the assumption 3.15 adds levels moment equations of the form 
E [(1·~t - aY,(t_l)) Y,(t- 1)] = 0 for t = 3, ... , T which remain valid even if Y is integrated 
of order one. This property is particularJy intercsting in our setting as labor shares are 
integrated of order one and the method allows estimating the autoregressive parameters 
I;l Aigebraically, data is transforrned using the following formula: ô;, 
(;~~~l) 1/2 [EH - T~r (ô,(t+l) + ... + Ô'T]' i.e. the transformaLion substracls Lhe mcan of the re­
maining future observations available in the sample. The first term weight~ the Lransformcd errors t.o 
eq\lalize their variance. 
11cf Arellano and Honoré (2001) p. 3244. 
CHAPTERIV 
DATA AND DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
This chapter presents the data used in our regression analysis. First, we outline 
the calculation to adjust labor shares to account for self-ernployrnenl. Second, we justify 
the choice of explanatory variables and state their sources. Our variables can be grouped 
into i) rnacroeconornic indicators ii) indicators characterizing the capital market and 
ùi) factors determining the labor market. Lastly, we undertake sorne transformations 
of the data in the light of nonstationarity. 
4.1 Labor Shares and the Adjustment for Self-Employment 
Labor shares are calculated as total labor compensation over total value added in 
national incorne. Data on value added national incorne and its cornponents is obtained 
from OECD National Account Datai or from national sources2 Labor compensation of 
ernp]oyees does not only comprise wages and salaries of employees but a]so related costs 
such as contributions to social security, private pensions, health insurance, life insurance 
and sirnilar schemcs. Capital shares are the complement to labor shares in value added 
They not only comprise corporate profits, i.e. dividends and undistributed profits, but 
also interests, proprietors' incorne and rentaI incorne of persons. Taxes on produc tion 
are also accounted for in capital shares. 
1 c.g. Lhat of the OECD STAN dalabase for Industrial Analysis 
2 cg. from the Bureau of Economie Analysis (BEA) for the United StaLes. 
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The main data to caleulate labor shares is drawn l'rom national accounts. OECD 
Source provides the Annual National Aeeounts Volume JJ - Delai/ed Tables - Main 
Agyregates Vol. 2005 r-elease 01 which gives detailed national accounts data for most 
OECD countries. Data is available l'rom 1970 onwards. It providcs numerous approaches 
(income approach, output approach etc.). The aj.Jproach used in this stucly is the Gross 
Value Added at Basic Priees by Industry approach (Table 6) and Cumponents of Value 
Added (Table 7) which segments value added into capital and labor shares. 'vVe also 
use the OECDSouree STAN Structural Analysis databasc to obtain more detailecl data 
down to industry levels, in particular tables in STAN InduslTi) Vol. 2005 release 05 
This database provides a wide range of economic indicators that arc compatible with 
the first database. In particular, this database combines national accounts data with 
data l'rom other sources, such as national business sun:eys. It is of importance to the 
present study because it breaks down value addcd national income into main industrial 
sectors and Sllb industries. FinalJy, we use data on the composition of total employrnent 
(i.e. the nurnber of salaricd wor!<ers and of self-employed per industrial sector). 
How to most adequately caleulate labor shares is highly controversial. An intuitive 
way to caleulate labor shares (LS) would be to divide labor compensation by total value 
added: LS = L7~~~~SJ::::r~~~:':lL However, this method ignores the fact that labor shares 
do not account for self-employment labor income Self-ernployed workers are defined as 
"persons who are the sole owners, or joint owners, of the unincorporated enterprises 
in which they work ... ". As information on self-ernployed income is not available, the 
OECD decidcd to completely exclude self-employed income l'rom the calculation of labor 
compensation in order not to falsify the correct data on employee compensation. Self­
employed incorne is th us accounted for in the share of capital categorized as "mixed 
income". Evidently, self-employed use labor and capital to produce output or provide a 
service. Caleulating labor shares ignOling self-employment incarne underestimates the 
total contribution of labor to value added. Overall labor shares should be adjusted to 
include labor incorne of self-employed. This adjustment is important when one considers 
the large differences in self-ernployment across countries and over time (cf. Figure A.2 
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III the appendix). 
The first step is Lhus to adjust labor shares to compensate for self employed in­
come. Information on sclf-employed income is hard to oLtain, estimates are lirnited 
to some countries and for recent years only. Even if self-employed incorne was known, 
this would not solve the question how their income should be split into labor and cap­
ital income. Literature on factor shares has proposed different methods to interpolate 
self-employed income. One straightfonvard and simple to use rnethod is Lo allocate an 
income equal to mean labor compensation for employees. The "corrected" labor share is 
th us calcu lated as follows: LS' = LaboT Compensatwn. (1 + Num.~eT of Self - E"'l'/O'led).
ad]usted Total Value Added 70tal Employment 
Labor shares are augrnented proportionally to the nurnber of self-employed in total ern­
ployment. 
However, this adjustment method is claimed not to take into account the dynamics 
of self employed income. Tirnbeau (2002) remarks that self-ernployed people enjoy larger 
incomes than employees. He therefore allocates an incorne equal to 120% of the mean 
income of employees. This seems to be an appropriate rncasure with respect to the 
current situation as rnost of the self-employed practice high income professions. In the 
1970s though, as a large part of self-employed workers represented agricultural workers, 
the average income of self-employed was probably inferior to average income.;] vVe 
therefore look at the dynamics of the composition of the working population not only 
over time but also across industries. 
Figure 4.1 displays the proportion of self-ernployment per industry for the five 
most important industries in the United States The OECD distinguishes bet\veen nine 
major industries. Self-employrnent seems to follow no major trend except for the agri­
cultural sector. The high proportion of self-employrnent in the 1970s falls constantly 
from 57% down to only 38% toda}'. This tendency is similar to that in other OECD 
countries. One way to bypass the problem of agricultural self-employment would be 
;1 Cf. Ca.rny (2006) 
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Figure 4.1 Self-Employment in Total Employment pel' Industry, USA. (Source: üECD, 
STAN database, Total Employment and Employees) 
to simply work \Vith non-agricultural value added data4 Ta provide a more complete 
picture of the economy we follow Askenazy (2003) in calculating labor shares for each 
industry separately, imputing a salary equal to the mean salary in the respective indus­
try. The üECD publishes not only labor compensation and value added pel' industry, 
but also the number of total cmployment and the llumber of employees pel' industry, 
the difference representing self-employed and unpaid family workers. 5 We can thus ilp­
ply the formula presented above for each industry separately. Resulting labor shares 
pel' industry are subsequently weighted according ta the importance of the respective 
industry in value added and then aggregated: 
LS' - "''' Total ValHe Added, [Labor Compensation, . (1 + NHmber 0/ Self -EmPloycd,)] 
- L..i=l Total \1 alue Added Total Value Added, Total Ernployment, ' 
1 CL A:;kcnazy (2003) 
SeL oceD (2005) 
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\vhere 1. = 1. 2, ...n is the industry index. 
Data a\'ailability reduces the pool of countrics to fifteen major OECD countries 
which allows a representativc compiuison of Anglo-Saxon versus European countl'ies. 
Our sample consists of Australia (AuS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada 
(CA~), Denmark (DNK), Finland (FIi\), France (FRA), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPI\), 
Germany (DEU)G, the Nethcrlands (NLD), Norway (\fOR), Spain (ESP), the Cnited 
Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (uSA). For most countries, data is 
available from 1970 onwards. When data on the nllmbcr of self-employed persons within 
a single inclustry was not availablc for the beginlling of the sample period. \\e illterpo­
la te shares backwarcls, assuming self-ernployrnent shares to be constant. for aIl industries 
but èlgricult ure where we assume a negati ve tendency consistent wit.h other countries. 7 
\Vhen data on labor compensation was missing, vve assume that la bol' shares caJculateci 
pel' industry follow the same tf'ndency as ovcrall labor shares which are available for ail 
15 cOllnt.ries from 1970 onwards. 
Figures 42 and 4.3 display the rcsulting labor shares for t\Vo sample countries, the 
United States and France JABOJ?_ FRA and LA BOR_ US,1 represent labor compensa­
tion divided by total value added, respectivel)' LS_ FRA anci LS_ USA are calculatcd 
as described above. The figures show that adjustment for self-cmployment prirnarily 
only shifts the labor share curvc upwards, tendencics seem to persist. However, it is in 
part true that adjustrnent for self-crnployment does cxtenuate the magnitude of labor 
share variations 8 The magnitude of the maximal increase/decrease in labor shares re­
duces from 8.7 to 4.7 percentage points in Germany, from 7.2 to 7.0 in France iilld from 
12.0 t.o 9.5 percentage points in Ital)', 
G Data on Germany up ta 1!Ell is on \-"est Germany onl)' 
'These adjustiTlcnts onll' affect the calculation of iabor sharcs for the 1'etherlands. 1Jeigium and 
Spain for no more than twO industries and for no more Lhan five years. 
8This is who.t Askenazy (2003) clairned. 
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Another important observation is the fact that correcting for self-employment 
has larger effects .on European countries because self-employmcnt is relatively more 
important on average. The increase in labor shares is more pronounced in European 
countries, which approaches the overall level of European labor shares to Anglo-Sa.xon 
levels which one might [alsely presume tü be higher t.han in Europe when analyzing 
Figures 1.2 and 1.1. The peak of average European labor shares in 1980 for instance 
increases from 55 % Lo 66 % ci ue to the adjusunent for se!f-employrnent. 
4.2 Choice of Variables 
We include three categories of variables: i) macroeconolflic \'ariablcs, i.e. CDP 
growth to account for cyclical fluctuations, inflation and trade to GDP as a rn<:nsure of 
globaJization ii) rneasures of the ca.pital market, i.e fînancial intermediation, private 
credit, claim on the private sector and stock tumO\'er ùi) measures that account for 
diff"erences in labor markets, i.e. union density, labor market flows, strikes and lockouts, 
replacement rates and minimum wage to average \l'age. In the follo\'.;ing section vvc 
outla)' the motivation for the choice of variables. 
4.2.1 Macroeconomie Variables 
GD? growLh (LOG(GDP)) 
vVe include GDP growth to account [or c:yclical fluctuations and differenccs in 
the overall macroeconomic performance for the countries analyzed. We should expect a 
negative corrclation between labor shures and GDP gIowth: The Iea! wage fluctuating 
much less over the cycle than the average prod uct ivity due ta wage rigid ities, addi tional 
income during economic booms will go to capital in fonn of grcater profits. ContTary, 
profits will be low during economic downturns, contributing to low capital shares. The 
counterpart, labor shar<~s, should thus be countercyclical.9 
ycf ~1crz (1995) for crnpirical and thcarcticô.1 cvid8nce. 
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Inflation ([NF) 
Second, we include the inflation rate. The peaks in labor shares around 1980 are 
associated with high lewls of inflation (cf. Figures 4.4 and 4.3). This supports the idea 
of a relationship between the t\\lO. As for European as \Vell as Anglo-Saxon countries, 
inflat ion increased in most countries up to the early eighties. Starting in the 80s and 
continuing throughout the 90s, inflation decreased due to new objectives in monetary 
policy, focusing on the control of inflation rates insteacl of accommodating monetary 
policy aiming at output growth. 
Disinl1ation in turn might have affected factor shares. Alcalà (2000) argues that 
disinflation favors capital through various channels. first, inflation causes fixed costs of 
priee acljustrnents to increase. Spcond. mark-up pricing on the basis of historical costs 
lowers real mark-ups when inflation is high. Higb inflation rates during the 70s might 
have contributed to increasing labor shares in Europe, whereas the stabilized situation 
in the 80s thanks to disinflation has motivated a stronger use of capital. The argument 
might however run in the opposite direction: firms facing higher costs clue to high real 
wages respond with illcreasing priees. 
vVhatever reason is the most pertinent, we consider movements in inflation rates 
too important to be ignored in regressions. Inflation is calculated for each country on 
the basis of the Consumer Priee Index (CPI) obtained from the OECD main economic 
. d· i d i b· CPI,,,-CPI,_I.' h CPf . th . . cl2n 2ca ors a a ase Vla Tit,i = CPl,.; w ere t,t 1S e consumer poce ID ex 
of country i in period i. 
Globaluation (TRADE) 
Thirclly, it is likely that globalization influences factor markets. The opening up 
of national to international markets, not only due to the European Union, resulted in 
higher international competition in product, capital and labor markets. Literature on 
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this topic argues that increased globalization increases the elasticity of labor demand la 
\,Vhat is more, globalization encourages factor substitution as firms have access to new 
marlœts. Greater investment possibilitics might favor capital shares, contributing to 
exp)ain constant)y falling labor shares in Europe during the 80s and 90s. 
Harrison (2002) argues radIer convincingly that increased globalization weakens 
employee power, reducing the part of surplus tbat is allocated to cmployees in the 
bargaining process of ernployees and employers over wages. She uses "measures of trade 
openness, capital account restrictions, and capital flows" to assess the dimension of 
globalization and relates these measures to factor shares. She comes up \Vith a weak 
but statistically significant negative impact of several globaJization measures on labor 
shares However, increased competition due to globalization is likeJy to reduce mark­
ups. an argument running against increasing capital shares. 
To find out whether globalization influences labor sbares we include tbe variable 
Tmde-to-GDpll It is defined as the sum of exports and irnports divided by CDP and 
thcrefore measures a country's openness or integration in the \Vorlll economy. Trade-/'o­
GDP has considerably increased in aIl of our sarnple countries. :\Icvertheless, there is 
no detectablc distinction between European and Anglo-Saxon countries. 'l'rade doubles 
to triples in aIl countries from 1970 up to today, the trend is srnooth and does not seern 
to be related to factors such as the cvolution of tbe European Union. 
4.2.2 Capital Market Imperfections 
Capital Market Imperfections can not be measured directl)' over time Ta ac­
count for changing capital markets we include differcnt measures tbat characterizc the 
performance of the capital market 
Financial Inlermediation (FI) 
10 e r. for instance Siaughter (2UlJl) 
11 The indicator is published by OECO Statis(ics, 08ti.lset: Macro trade inclicawrs. 
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A straightforward way of measuring the activity of financial intermediation is to 
calculate value added of this branch in national incorne. The OECD STAN IndlLstrial 
Database releases value added per industry from 1970 onwards. Financial intermedi­
ation l2 comprises three different categories, the first, Financial inttrmediation except 
insvrance and pension flLndinq corresponding to deposi tory insti tu tions, i.e. banks other 
than the central bank.J:l Figure 4.6 displays the part of financial intermediation in value 
aclded for sorne sample coun( ries. 
'vVe observe the follo\ving: financial intennecliation value acldcd increases for Eu­
ropean countries from 1970 up to the mid-1980s. The increase is much stronger from 
12 Financial intcrrnediarics are ail "units which incur liabilities on their own account on financial 
market.s by borrowing funds which they Icnd on diITcrenL t.errns and cOllditions to other institu tionai 
units". (Source: Or:CD Glossary). 
l:IThc other t.wa categories, Insumnce and pension Iundinq, except compuisory social secunly and 
Actwitze,; related to financwl intermediation arc of no intcrest ta our an;) ':~is. In the following l will 
rercr t.a this firsl. catcgory by simply financwl intcrm.ediation. 
4.0 
1980 onwards which might be interpreted as a result of i he deregulation of the bank­
ing scctor. Thcreafter, financial intermediation slow]y decreases in European count.ries 
As for Canada, financial intermediatiofl in value added increases throughout the time 
horizon in focus. Unfortunately, data is incomplete for sorne countries for the bcgillning 
of the sample period. Regressions will take chis fact into account by allo,ving for other 
cornplementary variables. The airn is ta assess whether ilJcreased activit.y of the banking 
sector is associated \Vi th decreases in labor shares. 
Privuk C7edii (PC) 
An addit.ional measure of the intensity of banking activity is tlle arnoulIt 01 bank 
dcposits. Beck (1999) et al have constructcd a Database on Financial Deveiopment 
and Structure covering a wide range of indicators of finallcia] cleveloprnent and structure 
across countries and over time. Indicators are grouped inco measurcs of the sizc, activity 
and efficiency of financial intermediaries and markets, respectively. The rneasure of the 
activity of thc banking sector, Privale credit by deposit money banks to GDP, is of value 
to our analysis. This measure isobtes credit issued to the private sector (excluding 
the central bank) as opposed to credit issued to governrncnts and public enterprises. 
It is thus a useful measure of bank activity in the sense of financial intermediatiolJ 
between ]enders and investors. Data from 1970 onwards is avaiJabJe for nearly ail fifteen 
countries 14 Pigure 4.7 displays the development of private credit for some cOllntries. 
Ail countries see a clear increase in lending activity over the samplc period. Credit 
seerns to be grcater in continental Europe compared to Anglo-Saxon countrics. 
Claim on the Private Sector (CLAIM) 
The International I\!IonetaTY Fund (IMF) proyides data gathered in banking sur­
veys and publishes it in t.he International Financial Statistics database. One of the 
interesting variables is the amount of claims of deposit money banles on the plivaLe sec­
1'1 Dat.a on Germa.ny stans in 1992 only 
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Figure 4.7 Pri\·ate Credit. (Source: OECD financial Structure Datasct, Wodd Bank) 
Lor. Deposit money banks comprise commercial banks and other fînancial institutions 
that accept transferable deposics, such as demand dcposits. Wc adjust data on daims 
on the private sector for currencies and divide by nominal GDP to give a comparable 
measures net of inAation. 
Banking Profit (PROFIT) and !nterest Revenue (INTEREST) 
To take into account the profîtability of the banking sector we recur at the 
SourceOECD Bank Profitability StaListics database which providcs a wide rage of in­
formation on income statemcnts, balance sheets and capital adcquacy. The incarne 
statement analysis allows extracting relative measures: we use profits 15 as a percentage 
of balance sheet total and the llet inLerest margin 1G to capture the profit margin. Dereg­
15Proiits include retaincd and distributed profilS 
IGThe net interest margin is dcflnded as interest incol1'Je minus intcrest expcnse dividcd by total 
ban k asscts 
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ulation incurring greater competicion are associated \vith lo\ver profits. DemirgUç-Kunt 
and Huizinga (2000) for instance analyze financial systems across countries and concludc 
that "the greater the development of a country's banks, the tougher is the competition, 
the greater is the efficiency and the lower are the bank margins élnd profits." 
Stock Turnover (STOCK) 
Lastly. wc account for the dynarnics of the stock market as a complement to the 
banking sector. V/hile stock markets are highly ueveloped in Anglo-Saxon cOllntries, 
European stock markets are relatively smaller. 1ï Financial deregulation and an cxpand­
ing stock market might motivate a modification of firms' financing activities, resulting 
in more equity and lcss debt financing. What is more, cOllntries with better fum:tioning 
markets may create a competitive environment that puts downward pressure on bank 
interest mat'gins. 1\1easures of the activity and efficiency of stock rnarkets are inclucled 
in the Financial Slruel'ure Dataset mentioned above \\'e follow Beek (1999) Pt. <li. in 
using thcir measure slock markel total value lraded lo GD? to measnre the acti"ity or 
liquidity of the stock markets. It is defined as total sha[(~s traded on the stock market 
exchange divided by GDf'. 
Note that financial regulation should equally be an important factor in the de­
termination of factor shares. However, exogenous measures of financial regulation are 
only available for some points in time, not on a yearly basis (cf. table 1.1 for instDncc). 
We thus have to restrict our analysis to potentially endogenous indicators such as bank 
profits and private credit. 
17 cf for ill~t.ance the lTleasure Stock Market Total Vaille Traded ta GDI' in l he Finnnclai S Truc­
[ure Da[aseL. 
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4.2.3 Labor 1'v1arket Rigidities 
Lastly, wc take into account labor market indicators. Vie approximate ernploy­
ment protection legislation by a number of labor market characteristics such as labor 
market Flows, unionization and minimum wage legislation. 
Employment Protection Legislation 
Employment protection legislation (EPL) indicators constructed by the OECD 1il 
suggest that labor is far lllore protected in European countries compared to Anglo-Saxon 
countries. The indicators are sumrnarized in Table 4.23: Employment protection on 
regular ernployment in aIl four categories, that is difficulty of clismissal, notice and 
severance pay, overall strictness of protection against dismiss8.ls and rcgular procedural 
inconveniences, is signiflcantly higher in European countries. The United States, the 
United Kingdom and Canada range among the least regulated countries. In 2003, taking 
clifficulty of dismissal as an example, the United States and the United King,dorn are 
rated 1.25 and 0.5, respectively, on a scale from 0 to 4. On the other extreme, France 
and Germany rated 3 and 3.25, respectively. Em ployment protection on tem porary 
employment shows even more dispersion in the strictness. !!) Furthermore, compnnng 
EPL indicators in 1990 and 2003 suggests th8.t European countries wherc legislatiol1 
\Vas particularly strict have slowl)' been adjusting to allow for greater flexibility. Albeit 
some convergence in the strictness of EPL between OECD countries, the classification 
of countries into strict and Flexible EPL is similar in 1990 and 2003. 
Employment protection is likel)' to protect labor shares in the short l'un, howevcr, 
111 the long l'un firms move away from costly and inflexible labor to a stronger use of 
capital. Caballero and Hammour (1997) for instance dernonstrate a positive correla.tion 
between the change in the capital to labor ratio and an index of job protection. Like\vise, 
1b cr. OECO Stati::>tics, Data::>et Strictness or EPL. 
l~cL OECD (2004), p. 71 
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Table 4.1 Employment Protection Legislation 
Dismissal Notice Strictness Incom'eniences 
1990 2003 1990 2003 1990 2003 1990 2003 
Australia 1.5 002 001 001 001 1.5 0.5 1.5 
Austria 425 3.75 0.02 086 2.92 237 25 25 
Belgium 175 175 2.286 243 168 173 001 0.01 
Canada 0.02 002 0.95 095 1.32 132 0.01 0.01 
Denmark 15 15 2.04 1.91 1.52 1.47 001 0.01 
Finland 1.75 275 1.86 0.01 2.79 2.17 4.75 2.75 
France 003 0.03 1.52 1.91 2.34 247 25 2.5 
German)' 325 3.25 001 1.29 258 268 3.5 35 
Italy 3.25 325 0.57 057 1.77 1.77 1.5 1.5 
Japan 333 35 1.81 1.81 2.38 2.44 002 002 
Netherlands 275 :U5 001 1.91 3.08 3.05 5.5 0.04 
Norway 3.75 375 001 001 2.25 2.25 0.02 002 
Spain 375 3.25 3.14 257 388 2.61 475 0.02 
United Kingdom 075 1.25 1.10 1.10 0.95 112 0.01 0.01 
United States 0.5 0.5 000 000 0.17 017 0.00 000 
Cont. Europe, a\'erage 2.94 2.88 1.70 1.68 2.47 2.27 278 225 
Northern Europe 2.75 3.25 1.43 001 252 220 338 238 
Anglo-Saxon, average 1.08 1.25 068 068 081 0.87 067 0.67 
Dlsm:ssal stands for dlfficulty of dlsnnssal 
Notice stands for notice and severence pay 
Strictness stands for overall strictness of protection against dismissals 
Inconveniences stands for regular proced ural inconvcniences 
Source: OECOStat, Oataset: Strictncss of EPL, regular employment 
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Gomez-Sahador et al. (2004) find that EPL significantly reduces job creation. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to include measures of ernployment protection into 
our regressions as indicators on hand are point in time estimates. Time series data is 
either not available for a representative set of countries or casts doubt on the rcliability. 
Caballero and Hammour admit that their index20 "is far from a sufficient index for the 
actual severity of [... ] firing restrictions." The üECD EPL indir:ator is restricted to 
three points in time, notably in 1990, 1998 and 2003. Few researchers have tried to 
construct measures across time (cf. Lazear, 1990). However, they rernain difficult to 
compare with the more general measure published by the üECD. A possible solution is 
to approximate EPL, or labor market Acxibility in more general, by ot'her labor market 
indicators that we will consider each in turn. 
Labor market flo'Ws (FLOWS) 
A first idea to approxirnate labor market flexibility is by labor market flows. 
Researchers agree that weak employment prot.ection is associated wi th high job in- and 
outfiows, indicating greater flexibili ty21 The general mobility ratc22 in Canada for 
instance was nearly twice as high as in Belgium (2001). Data on labor market flows is 
published in a database of the international Labor Organization (ILO), Key Indicators 
of the Labor Market for nine out of our] 5 countries. 
Uniomzation (UNION) 
Second, stronger labor unions in European countries keep wages relatively higher 
and stickier. Union power as a measure of workers' bargaining power might explain 
2° Lhe index is based on the length of the mandatory severancc payrnents and of the advanccd 
notification period. 
21 cf for instance Bcrtola, Bocri and Cazes (1999). 
n General mobility rate is defined as the sum of inflow into and outflow from Wfl.gc &. saJaried 
employment, sec ILO Labor market indicators. 
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relativel)' large labor shares in continental Europe during the 1970s. However, unions 
have become less powerful in Europe, cnabling firms to offer wages closer to marginal 
procluct of labor Unions in Anglo-Saxon countries were weaker ta start with, so that the 
real wage \Vas close to marginal product of labor on average. OECD Siaiisiics publishes 
the total number of employees and that of union members, the latter obtained from 
surveys. This data can be used to calculate the union mcmbership ratio to approximate 
labor union power As one rnight suggest, union membcrship is lov; in Anglo-Saxon 
countries (12% in the United States in 2002) and relatively high in European countries 
(74% in Denmark) Union density in Europe shows ;,n increase in the Hl70s n~verting 
III 1980 and slowly decrea5ing up ta today This devclopment might be of importance 
in the attempt to 0xplain the increase and follo\Ving decrease in labor shares. 
RepLacemenl Hales (RH) 
Third, another indicator of the generosity of a social system is the al1lount of 
benefits paid to the unemployed. Replacement rates show the level of pensions as a 
percentage of previous individual earnings. The OECD publisllCS average replacement 
rates for the period of 1970 up to today. Clearly, replacement rates are higher in Eu­
ropean countrics than in Anglo-Saxon countries: III 2003, the average replacement rate 
in the Nethcrlands \Vas 53% cornpared to only 14 % in the United States. Replacement 
rates do not show a common tendencv, increasing irregularly for rnost countries. 
Sirikes and LockouLs (STRIJ(E) 
Fourth, we follow Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1999) in using the nurnber of strikes 
and Jockouts normalized by the number of employees in that year to capture workers' 
bargaining power. Data is obtained From the ILO LABORSTA database. Thcre are 
enormous differences in the number of st.rikes and lockou ts. Among the highest races are 
Finland (with an average of 0.44 strikes per employee), Australia (026), Denmark (O. ]8), 
France and Italy (0.13) Low strike countries are Austria (0.0012), the Netherlands 
(0.0044) and the Unit.ed States (0.0011). IvIoreover, one can observe a negative tendency 
4.7 
for almost ail countries from 1973 onwards. An exception is Denmark experiencing 
peaks in the late 90s. 
A1'lnimum wagc to ave.mgc wage (lvllNWAGE) 
Lastly, we include the ratio of minimum wage t.o average wage (from the OECD 
DatalJuse un Labour Force 8talistics) , Minimum wages determine the cost of lo.bor 
especially for jobs which are easily substitutable. Recent expericnce suggests that a 
well-designed minimum wage might foster higher ernployment by "guaranteeing lhat 
work pays better than remaining on social benefits" 23 . The ratio of the rninirnllm 
\vage to the average wage is highest in France (0.609 in 2003). On the other extrerne 
ranges Spain (0.288 in 2003) followed by Japan and the United States (0.31 and 0,32, 
respectively). 
The list of indicators of labor market rigidity is far richer; however, not aIl turn 
out to be of importance in regressions. Other indicators of labor market rigidity would 
be interesting as for instance collective bargaining measurernents, unemployment benefit 
duration, etc. Unfortunately. data availability constraints limit the number of indicators 
that can be used in the regression. Total labor taxes for instance expia in why labor is 
more expensiV<' in European countries compared to Anglo-Saxon countries 24 However, 
as labor taxes are accoullted for in the labor share, we can be sure that the inclusion of 
this variable will bias our rcsults. 
Product Aiarket Regulation (PM R) 
Cornplementary to labor market regulation, one should expect product market 
regulation to play an important raIe in the determination of factor shares. The OECD 
2lcf, OECD (2006) 
2"Tatallax \',edge amaunts la anly 16% (2004) in the United St.ates compared ta 39% in France. 
(Sotm;tOECD Taxing Wages Slallslics) 
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Table 4.2 Product 1\larket Regulation 
Australia 
A ustria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Gerrnany 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Spain 
United KingdolTl 
linited States 
Cont. Europe, average 
Northern Europe 
Anglo-Saxon, average 
Source: OECD, lnd icat.ors or Product Ma,ket l1eg 
Product tvlarket Regulation 
1998 2003 
1.3 0.9 
1.8 1.4 
2.1 1.4 
14 1.2 
1.5 11 
2.1 1.3 
2.5 1.7 
1.9 14
 
28 ll)
 
1.9 1.3 
1.8 lA 
1.8 1.5 
2.3 16 
1.1 09 
1.3 1.0 
2.1 15
 
20 14
 
1.3 1.0 
uialion 
(2001) finds that for instance anti-competitiw product market regulat.ions have signif­
icanc negative effects on non-agricultural employment rates and that product market 
rcgulation that curbs competition has positive implications [or wage premia. Table 4.2.3 
shows the overall indicator for product market reguJation calculated by the OECD. The 
indicator is an aggregate of different measures of prad uct market regulation such as 
rneasurcs of state control, of barriers to entrepreneurship, of barriers to trade and to 
investment. The indicator gives a similar picture to that of the EPL indicator: first, we 
can observe a general declinc in product market regulation from 1993 ta 2003. Second, 
Anglo-Saxon countries seem ta be less regulated that central European countries. 
unfortunately, the indicator and sub-indicators are available for two points in time 
only, so that we ca.nnot include the indicator in our empirical regression. 'vVe should 
however keep in mind that product ma.rket regulations play certainly an important raIe 
in the deterrnination of employment rates and wages t.hat we cannot account for in the 
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regression. 
4.3 Data Transformation 
The indnstry financial interrncdiation is a fraction of national income. Therefore, 
we need to exclude this industry from the calculation of labor sharE~s when regressillg 
the latter on financial intermecliation to ayoid collinearity. We will den ote labor shares 
excluding the financial intermediation industry by LSWOF as opposed to labor shares 
including ail industries L5. This operation does not change the eH)lution of labor shares, 
it merely shifts the cmves slightly downwards. 
As a common phenomenon of time series data, most of our series arr autocone­
lated. A correlograrn on for instance labor shares in Germany reveals that labor shares 
are highly autocorrelated which suggests that labor sb ares are integrated. Theoreti ­
cally, there is no rea.son for labor shares to be integrated, the variable should ahvays 
return Lo its equilibrium value. However, we cannot reject the test on the hypothe­
sis that labor shares are integrated which \\Oe interpret as a small sarnple estimation 
problem. Our empirical specification thus has to take into account the fact that labor 
shares might be integrated. 1'0 verif)' this obs8rvation and to determine the orcier of 
integration \Ve perform the Augmented Dickey-Fvoller (ADF) und rool lesL. The test on 
L5WOF _DEU for exarnple fails to reject the test in levels but rejects the test in firsL 
differences (cf. Tables B.l and B.2 in the appendix). The series is thus illLegrated of 
order one. Repeating the test for all other cou nt ries reveals that the sarne is true for 
all sample labor shares 25 The sarnc applies to most of our explanatory variables: G DP 
for instance grows at an approximatE:ly constant rate, sa we use the logarithm of GDP 
and differentiate to make the series stationary. Inflation contains a unit root, as \Vell 
as financial intermediation Surnmary statistics of aIl primary variables are provided in 
2'One might interpret.e the turn in labor shares in 1980 as a structural break which potentia.lly 
invalidates the ADF test. However, the alternative test proposed by Phillips and Perron (PP) (1988), 
which allo\\'s for one st.ructural break. equally does not reject t.he unit root Lest in le\'el5 and rejeets the 
test in first dirterenees for ail countric" but the USA. 
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t.he appendix, cf Tables B.3 - B.6. 
lIowever, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and its a!tematives are often criticized 
for their low pov,,'er, that is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis (that the 
series is 1(1)) \vhen in fact the process is stationary is lo,v when the coefficient is close 
to uni ty26 This is why we additionally perform panel unit root tests, Panel-based unit 
root tests have higher power than unit root tests based on individual tirne series because 
they make use of the larger ci'oss-section sample. A summary of five tests on the series 
LSWOF is displayed in Table 4.3. AI1 the results indicate the presence of il, unit root. 
The Levin Lin & Chu, the lm, Pesaran and Shin \iV-stat test and uoth Fisher tests fail 
to reject the nuit of a unit root. Similarly, the Hadri test stat.istic, whic:h tests the null 
of no unit root, strongly rejccts the nul1 hypothesis in favor of a unit root. 
Tests on the other variables are not shown but cOllfirm the presence of a unit. TOO" 
Jl1 the logarithrn of GDP, private credit, claims on the private scctor, stock turnover, 
trade and strikes pel' employees; and sta.tionarity for financial intermediation, minimal 
wage to average wage and union membership. The tests on inHation are now in favor 
of stationary, where the tests include intercepts and trends. Nonstationary data can 
be differenced once to give stationary series. For the first specification, our depcndent 
variable is thus first differenced labor shares instead of levcls 27 
The presence of both dependent and independent integrnted variables brings up 
the question of cointegration. To check for the presence of cointegration between labor 
shares and GDP growth and/or inflation we simply regress labor shares Ofl the latter 
and subject. resulting enor series to unit fOOt tests For rnost cases, the series indicate 
integration of order one which alludes to the absence of cointegration. However, our 
rather simplistic tests are likely to suffer from little sarnple bias so \-l'e cannot fully 
exclude the eventuality of cointegration. 
26 C[ Smith (2001) 
27This is the r.ransfonnation ITIcthod that Smith (2001) proposes for nonstiltionary panel dat.a in 
the case of no cointegration. 
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Table 4.3 Summary Panel Unit Root Tests on Labor Shares 
Panel unit root test: Summary 
Sample: 1970 2005 
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Autornatic selection of maximum lags 
Autornatic selection of lags based on AIC: 0 ta 4 
Andrews bandwidth selection using BartleU kerncl 
Method 
Null: Unit root 
Levin, Lin, Chu t* 
Statistic 
1.90607 
Prob** 
0.9717 
Cross-sections 
15 
Oh::; 
490 
f\ ul!: uni t root 
lm, Pesaran and Shin \V-stat 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 
pp - Fisher Chi-square 
3.76400 
8.27070 
10.3657 
0.9999 
1.0000 
0.9997 
15 
15 
15 
490 
490 
509 
NuJl: No unit root 
Hadri Z-stat 11.5101 0.0000 15 524 
** Probabilities for the Fisher test are computed using an asymptotic Chi­
Squared distribution. Ali other tests assume asymptotic llormality. 
CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
This chapter presents estimation results. The panel regrcssions inc1ude a sellsi­
tivity analysis allowing for alternative estimation metlIods and aclditional variables. An 
interpretation completes this chapt.er. 
5.1 Panel Regressions 
Panel regression are performcd on the total pool of 15 countries. To address the 
omitt.ed variable problem we use the fixed effects cstimat.or. The mct.hod uscd is Feasible 
GLS where the cross section covariances are estimatcd from a first.-stage pooled OLS 
rcgression. 1 Cross section weighting accounes for cross-equation heteroskeda'3ticity. To 
account for integration we follow Smith (2001) in differentiating series containing unit 
root.s. He argues that, in case of no cointegrat.ion and integrated clependent. variables 
the first difference model is appropriate. The base regression we run takes the follO\ving 
form: 
lWe follow the preferred estimation rnethod of Baltagi and Griffin (]997). Their analysis on 
18 eounr.ries over 3] years on the gasoline demand suggcsts that pooled e~tirnators are preferable to 
country specifie regrcssions and two stage least squares procedures. 
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where the subindices denoLe countries (i = 1; .. , 15) and time (t = 1970,.,2005)2 
LSWOFit denotes the labor share and DO is the first difference operator, 
Ci denotes the time invariant Dxed effect for counLry i, 
GDP,t is GDP and LOGO is the logarithrn operator, 
IN Fit the inflation rate, 
F l,t the measure of financial interrneeliation and 
'rIit is the ranclom disturbancc. 
The regression 5.1 might. suffer from specification errors which we will address 
below but serves as a startillg point. Regression results are presentcd in Table 5.1. 3 
The estimated effect of financial intermediation is highly stat.istically significant and 
ncgative. This implics that highcr capital market performance and a weil elevelopcd 
financial system are associated \Vith decreasing labor shares. A.n increase in financial 
incermediation of one percentage point has a ncgative impact. of 0.336 on short run labor 
share changes. The other coefficients in the mode! appear plausibly estimated: GDP 
growth enters \Vith a negative sign, the effect being weak but statistically significant 
at the One percent level. The negative sign is consistent with thcorctical assumptions 
made in chapter 4 and theoretical and empirical evidence of r\'lc1'2 (1995). Inflation 
enters \Vith a significant and positive coefficient, as expected. Stock turnover enters 
\Vith a weak positive sign. This might be interprcted as an cmpirical affirmation of the 
theoretical argument presented by Perotti and Spier (1993): highcr equity financing at 
the cletriment of clebt financing lowers the power of employers in the bargaining process 
\Vith employees and thus might positivel)' affect wages and lal>or shares. The cffect is 
2Pesaran and Smith (1995) note that, in the case of integratcd variables, differcncing removes 
sorne of the seriai correlat.ion that might arise du<' Lo the "inappropriate imposition of homogeneity on 
the slope coeflicienr.s". 
3 vVe include the variable STOCK in the regression because its omission results in autocorreJat.ed 
error terms and a low Durbin- Watson statistic. 
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Table 5.1 FE Regression Results: Ali countries
 
Variable Coefficient SLd. Error t-Statistic Prob.
 
--:::----------c:--::--:-::--:----,---------:-:-:-:------ ­
C 0009552 0.003634 2.628338 00093 
D(LOG(GDP _ ?)) -0.086878 0.028284 -3.071605 00025 
FI ? -0.336358 0077691 -4.329409 00000 
INF ? 0131528 0022251 5911011 00000 
STOCK ? 0.003531 0000821 4.300839 00000 
Weighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.300688 
Acljusted R-squarcd 0.23'2277 
Durbin- V\iatson stat 1.955235 
Unwcighted Statistics 
R-squared 0293812 
Sum squarcd resid 0017730 
Durbin-Watson stat 1977183 
Dependent Variable: D(LSWOF ?) 
]Vlethod: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section Iveights) 
Effects Specification: Cross-section fixed (dulI1rny variables) 
Sarnple (adjusted): 1971 2003 
Included observations: 33 after adjustments 
Cross-sections incl uded: 15 
Total pool (unbalanccd) observations: 332 
Linear estimation after onc-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors and covariance 
however weak but statistically significant. 
The cross specific fixed cffects are not reportcd, the presented parame ter c rep­
resents the average of the Ci. The reported Durbin Watson Statistic is close to :2 so we 
should not worry about autocorrelation in the error term or misspecification. As it has 
been mentioned above, the assumption of fixcd effects can be testcd \Vith the help of 
the Wu-Hausmann test. The test estimates both the random and the fixed estimates 
mode. Second, estimations of the fixed and random effect parameters Ci are obtained 
via êi = Yi - Xij]. The Wu-llausrnann test then consists in testing the nul! hypothesis 
Table 5.2 FE Regression !lesults llsing Log Tran::;formation 
Variable Coefficil'nt Std. Error t-Stat.istic Prob. 
C 0.115468 0.037886 3074138 0.0023 
D(LOG(GDP _ ?)) 0594226 0284935 243644 00154 
FI ? 
-1.442209 0677855 -2.127606 0.0:342 
lNF ? 234794 0.210376 11.16066 0.0000 
Weighted Statistics 
R-sql1ared 0.89347 
Adj \lsted R-squared 0.887552 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.496459 
Unweighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.891171 
Surn squarcd resid 2.480238 
Durbin- \Vi1,tson stat 0.441977 
Dependent Variable: LOG(LS\iVOF_? /(I-LS\iVOF _")
 
Method: Pooled EG LS (Cross-section weights)
 
Effects Specification: Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
 
whether the randorn effects model is well specified, th8.t is, whether the differences br.­
tVl;een the randorn effects and the fixcd effects are smal!. The res111 ts of the test on our 
data provide strong evidence against the null hypothesis. We can thus conclude that 
the theoretic8..! assllmptions in chapter 3 were legitimate. 
HoweveL this regression contains a conceptuaJ problem: Labor shares are a ratio 
cornprised in the interval [0,1] The above formulation regresses first difference labor 
shares on inflation and economic grO\vth. This means Lhat, in the stationary state, 
where the inflation rate and the growth rate are stable, the model predicts a certain 
level of first difference labor shares, and thus a labor share above 1 or below O. This is 
why we transform labor shares to allow boundlessness. This can be done by a logistic 
transformat.ion logtrans _ L5 = log( l ~fs) which results in values on the interval [­
00,00). 
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Table 5.2 shows results for the GLS regression where labor shares in first dif­
ference have been replaced by the log transformation. The correlation coefficient R2 
increases substantially, however, the Durbin \J\'atson Statistic points to aut.ocorrelat.ion 
in the elTor term. The regression results replicate the respective signs of our explana­
tory variables from the first regression. However, significance Jevels decrease for the 
coefficient on financial intermediation and that of GDP. 
An alternative estimation rnethod that accounts for the likely presence of integra­
tion in the dependent variable is the specification in lcvels including lags of the latter 
The second specification we run is 
2 
LSI·\lOFit = Ci + I>t LS\1/0Fi(t-l) + f3 Inj IN Fit + (3 Fi F/û 
1=1 
2 
+ L/3coP_IG'DP;(H) + Till' (C).2) 
/=0 
This specification allo\l's to get an idea of the first. order autocorrelation of labor shares 
and to eliminate potential bias due to cointcgration. We follo\V Bentolila and Saint­
Paul (2003) in regressing actua! labor shares rather than logarithms of labor shares. 
As a convenient side effect, the specificatioll in Jevels of the panel estirnator facilitates 
the Interpretation of the estimat.ed coefficients: the /3 depict the effect of a change in 
the cxplanatory variable on the lcvcl of labor shares instead of first differenced labor 
shares. Estimation results are presented in table 8.7 in the appendix The coefficients 
on inflation and financial intermediation are similarly signed, however, their magnitude 
cannot be compared ta coefficients estimated above because the presence of lagged 
dependent variables changes fundamentally the interpretation of the coefficients. The 
lagged dependent variables ernbody the past values of the explanatory variables so 
that any "measured influence" of inflation or financial intermediation is "the effect 
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of new information" 4 Labor shares are countercyclical which results in il coefficient 
of GDP grawth on labor shares of -0.07 which is statistically significanL Financial 
intermediatiofl yields a coefficient of about -0.1: an increase in financial intcrmediation 
in national income of one percentage point can explain the decrease in labor shares 
of 01 percentage points. Finally, inflation seems to positively affect labor shares: an 
increase of one percent in inflation increases labor shaH~s by 0.1:\ pcrcentage points. 
The coefficient on lagged labor shares of 0.95 suggests tbat labor shares are most likely 
integrated. 
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
ln \'I:hat follows, we check [or the robustness of our resldts. We seek to improve 
the specification above by varying the estimation methods used. Second we vaTY the 
number o[ countries included. Last we widen the anaJysis in allowing for alternative 
variables of potential importance. 
Table 5.3 investigates the sensitivity of the coefficients on the explanatory vari­
ables to a range of alternative specifications. We take the specifications in Table B.7 
as a baseline. The coefficients from the baseline regression are reported in the top 
raw of Table 5.3. 5 Each row of the table represents a different specification. In aU 
ca..ses the coefficient on financial intermediation is negative, irnplying that higher capital 
market performance is associated with low labor shares. The estimated effects of finan­
cial intermediation are mostly highly statistically significant. Similarly, the coefficient 
on inflation is l'obust to alternative specifications, the coefficient is highly statistically 
significant in ail specifications. Inflation is associated with high labor shal'es 
first, we notice that GDP growth is endogenous and rnight thus bias our results. 
The FE estimator allows for endogenous fixed effects but requires the exogenei ty of 
"Greene (2003) p. 307 
5 \Vc still includc lagged GOr growt.h and two periods laggcd labor shares in the regrcssion but 
est.imated coefficients arc nOL shown to concent.rate on the primary variables of inlcrcst. 
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Table 5.3 Sensitivity of Coefficients to Alternative Specifications 
1 Estirnated coeffcients for the 
baseline explanatory variables 
Specification LSWOF (-1 ) INF FI LOG(GDP ) 
Bascline 0.949557 0.130535 -0.104689 -0.07026/1 
[0.047433] [0.019016] [0.055431] [0.022785] 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0599) (0.0022) 
GLS with IV	 0.837812 0.115182 -0.721902 ­
[0.020197] [0.021284] [0.118974] 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Europe only	 0.837453 0.130172 -0.753515 ­
[0.022068] [0.017243] [0.132393] 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Con t. Europe	 0.784473 0.188555 -1.128763 ­
[0.064399] [0.0733681 [0.318374] 
(0.0000) (00110) (0.0005) 
White Period	 0.837812 0.115182 -0.721902 ­
[0.032089] [0.035354] [0.178398] 
(0.0000) (0.0013) (0.0001) 
Period FE	 0.613904 0.596901 -1.085081 
[0.081472] [0.143637J [0.813587] ­
(00000) (00000) (01835) 
GMM	 0.858917 0.129788 -0.392864 -0.136509 
')(orthogonal) 1 [0.06_902] [0.024563] [0.1638071 [0.030950] 
1 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0171) (0.0000) 
GMM 0.305754 0.155265 -0.464373 -0.228440 
(first difference) [0.0571U9] [0.035031] [0.231730] [0.027586] 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0460) (0.0000) 
St.andard errors are given in square brackcts 1; and p-values in round brackets () 
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explanatory variables. \,Vooldridge (2001) rernarks that the Fixee! effects estirnator is 
"inconsistent if an explanatory variable in sorne time period is corre!atcd with 7]il"'" 
where "the size of the inconsistency might be small .. ". We thus recur at an instrumental 
estimator (IV) which instruments GDP growth and its lag. The second row of table 
53 (cf. line GLS with IV) gives estimation rcsults of the two-stage GLS estimation 
where instruments inclnde GDP growth and GDP growth lagged, two periods la.gged 
labor shares, lagged inflation and union power. The estimated coefficient on financial 
inLermediatioIl is now significanl al the 1% level and jurnps [rom -(ua to -0.72; implying 
a much grcatcr negativc effect of financial intcrrnediation on labor sharcs The coefficient 
011 inflation is slightly weakened. \Ne conclude that instrumenting GDP growth seelJ1S 
to importantly improve our estimation results. 
Second, we want to I<now whether labor shares in European countries are affecteJ 
differently than the l'est (cf. line t'umpe only). Removing Anglo-Saxon countries leads 
to an increase in the estimated coefficient of inflation on labor shares [rom 0.115 to 
0130. More imporlantly, it increa.ses the coefficient on financial intermediation [rom 
-0722 to -0.754. Dropping l'\ordic countries from the panel (cf line Cont Europe) 
further increases the estirnated impact of financial illterrnediation on la.bor shares to 
-1.129. The inflation coefficient also increases significantly to 0.189 Ali coefficients are 
highly significant. We might conclude that the effects of finaneial intermediation are of 
greater importance in Europe than in Anglo-Saxon countries. This observation goes in 
line with the thought earlier discussed that decentralization of the financial sector in 
European countries during the] 980's brought about more pronounced changes whereas 
Gnancial markets were relatively dccentralized in Anglo-Saxon countrics to start with. 
The last four specifications al ter the assumptions concerning the estimation proce­
dure. First, we assume period specifie heteroskedasticity instead of cross-section specifie 
heteroskedasticity (cf. liue White penod). That is, the coefficient covariance method 
used is the ·White period estirnator discussed in chapter 3 instead of the White cross­
section estimator used in the base mode!. The rnethod does not change the coefficients 
estimated but yields other standard errors, which however cio not alter the [aet that ail 
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three coefficients are highly significant. 
Second, allowing for fixed time effects in addition to fixed cross section effects does 
not yield significant results (cf. line Period FE). The estimated coefficients on inflation 
and Ônancial intermediation increase but the latter is no more signiôcant. However, pe­
riod fixed effects do not show an)' pattern nor are they statistically signincant. Allowing 
for nxed time effects without any cross section effects does not yield significant rt~sults. 
Third, we follow Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) in using the dynamic panel 
estimator (cf. li ne CMM, orthogonal) proposcd by Arellano and Baver (1995). The 
Arellano and Bover estimator allows for cndogencity of the explanatory variables which 
allows us to include CDr growth in the variable list. The estimation method llses 
orthogonal dcviations instead of differences for l'casons ùiscussed in chapter 3. The 
estimator is designed to incl ude a grO\ving nurnber of laggcd depcndent variables as 
instruments. l1owever. as om time series dimension is quite large this method would 
result in a grand nurnber of instruments. Given that the small samplc bias increases 
with the number of instruments, we prefer to restrict the nurnber of lagged dependent 
variables to Cl. maximum of five. Wooldridge (2001) states that "in practice, it may be 
better to use a couple of lags rather than lags back to t = 1. "f) The coefficient on lagged 
labor shares of 0859 indicates high autocorrelation of labor shan~s. The coefficients on 
inflation and financial intermediation come close to coefficients pre\'iously estimat.ed. 
We conÔrrn the negative correlation of GDP growth and labor shares, the coefficient 
grows \Vith respect to the baseline specification to -0.137. This irnplies that labor sbares 
are countercyclical: an increase of 1% in GDP growth increases capital shares·and thus 
decrcases labor shares by about 0.137 percentage points. The coefficient is significant at 
the 1% leveL The coefficient on financial intermediation drops to - .393 (wi th respect to 
the CLS wilh IV specification), whereas the coefficient on inflation is slightly stronger 
(0.130). 
6The Gr.i[~1 weighting rlJethoo is again cross section wczghts which assumes the presence of 
cross-section heteroskedasticity. The coefficient covariance rncthod is the White penod method which is 
robust to arbitrarily seriai correlation and lirnc-varying varialJces in the disturbances 
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Fourth, using instead the Arellano and Bond estimator (1991) (cf. line GMM, firsl 
difference) which transforms data by first differencing yields cvcn stronger coefficients: 
the coefficient on financial intermediation grows from -0.393 to -0.464, the coefficient 
on inAation from 0.130 to 0.155. The coefficient on lagged labor shares is CI lot weaker 
(0.310) which is hO\\'ever consistent with the finding of Blundell and Bond (1998) that, 
fur high values of ak, the first difference GMM estimator suffers "both a huge dowllward 
bias" and yields "very imprecise estimates [for ak]." 
l'\ext, wc test for specifications including alternative vn.riahlcs. Rpgression reslllts 
are shown in Table 5.4. 'iVe start off with the last but one specification, G!\H\Jl \vith 
orthogonal deviations, as the baseline regression because this estimation rnethod scems 
to most appropriately capture the specifie features of om an8.1ysis. The first coluron 
(cf. Baseline) presents results from the Grdl\l specification. The inclusion of alternative 
\'ariables does not change signs but only aflects the magnitude and significance lcvels 
of the base line variables. III ail instances, the coefficient on financial intermediation 
is statistically significant ami negative, implying lower labor shares as financial inter­
mediation is strong. The coefficient on inflation is statistically signiflcant in ail but 
one specification. Coefficients on GDP growth and laggcd labor shares remain highly 
statistically significant as weIl. 
First, we test for a number of labor market indicators discussed in chapter 4 (cf. 
column Labor market). Accounting for labor market dynarnics results in enforcing the 
eiTects of the baseline variaLJies: the coefficient on inflation increases From 0.129 to 0.162 
and the coefficient on financial intermediation from -0.459 to -0.528. As for the new 
\'ariables, aIl of these estimates are statistically significant. but. effects are ambiguolls. 
The greatest impact on labor shares is that of union densit.y. Union density enters 
\Vith a positive coefficient suggesting that higher employee power protects labor shares 
(in the short run). The estimated coefficient on labor market f10ws is positive, which 
contradicts the assumption that high labor market regulation (which is associated with 
low labor market Aows) protects wages and therefore labor shares. Low labor market 
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Table 5.4 Panel Estimates Including Alternative Variables 
Variable Baseline Labor market Capital market 
LSWOF (-1) 0.864795 0.781190 0.787698 
[0.062218] [0.06,)411] [0.059389] 
(0.0000) (00000) (0.0000) 
INF' 0.128612 o161602 0108306 
[0.024264] 10.026423] [0.075226] 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1531) 
FI -0459046 -0.527947 -0.132696 
[0.178037] [0.192734] [0.198860] 
(0.0104) (0.0066) (0.0506) 
LOG(GDP _) -0.134889 -0101750 -0.224145 
[0.030789] [0.034118] [0.033454] 
(0.0000) (0.0031) (0.0000) 
UNION 0.036524 
[0.015681] 
(00206) 
FLO\VS 0.000573 
[0.000340] 
(0.0952) 
TllADE -0.00U506 
[0000129] 
(0.0001) 
STOCK 0002867 
[0.000903] 
(0.0020) 
PC -0009699 
[0006908] 
(0.0635) 
I;\TEREST -0001189 
[0.002442J 
(0.7272) 
CLAII"1 0011934 
[0.0035721 
(0.0012) 
Standard errors arc gi\'en in square brackets li and p-vaJues in round bracket.s () 
Summary 
0.510482 
[0.0999631 
(0.0000) 
0.248737 
10.074900/ 
(0.0011) 
-0.184786 
[0.241624] 
(0.0445) 
-0.225632 
[0.058033] 
(0.0002) 
o10804.7 
[0.0459241 
(0.0200) 
-0.001210 
[0.0002711 
(0.0000) 
0004016 
[0.003622] 
(0.2693) 
-0.033308 
[0.0116201 
(0.0048) 
-0.001994 
[0.003703] 
(0.5910) 
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Aows, indic:ating difficulties in hiring and firing etc., might induce firms ta shift away 
from labor ta a more intensive use of capital This logic is consistent \Vith che findings of 
Caballero and Hammour (1998) They suggest that employers rnight respond ta costl)' 
and inflexible labor by substituting capital for labol". 
Unfortunately, other labor market indicators do not yield significant rcsults. The 
inclusion of the number of strikes per cmployes results in a positive estimatcd coefficient 
suggesting that higber employee power protects labor shares The coefficient is hOlvever 
not statisticalJy significant and very weak. Bentolila ancl Saint-Paul (2003) argue that 
increasing bargaining power of employecs creates a gap betwecn che marginal revenue 
product o[ labor and the wage, thus positively inAuencing labor shares in the short rUIl 
but leaving ernployment unc:hanged. Last, replacement rates (Rn) cio not yiclcl any 
signiflcant results. 
Lastly, we can confirrn the assumption that globalization reduces labor shares. 
The tracle coefficient is statistically significant ancl negative. The result is l.jualitatively 
consistent \Vith empirical finclings by Harrison (2002): her regressions result in a negative 
impact of globalizocion rneasures on labor sharcs. Our estimated coefficient is slightly 
stronger compared to her estirnatecl coefficient on trade-to-GDP, which might be clue 
to the fact that her regression inclucles alternative measures of globalization. 
The cmpirical results on labor market indicators are th us ambiguous. This rnight 
be clue ta differences in the short run and long run cffects of labor protecting factors: 
in the short l'un, strong union power, high labor a.cljustment costs etc. might eflectively 
protect cmployrnent and thus positively affect labor shures. However, the same faclors 
might cliscourage firms ta employ costly labor. ln the long fun, firms will substitute 
capit.al for labor where possible. V/hat is more, we note that this version shoulcl be in­
terpreted with care as data. availability for labor f10ws reduces the pool ta ten countries 
only. Excluding the variable FLO WS [rom the regression cloes not change coefficients 
on the other variables much, but recluces the level of significance of sorne. The same 
argument applics for the inclusion of the relative measure of the minimum wage. In­
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c]llsioll of this variable results in a weak positive coefficient which is consistent with 
the theoretical considerations in chapter 4. However, data availability furthcr redllces 
the country panel to nine countries. As this variable is not statistically significant, we 
exclude it from the regression. 
The second alternative specification tests for alternative measures of the capital 
market performance (cf. column Capital market). Accounting for alternative capital 
market dynamics results in weakening the effects of the ba.seline variables: the coefficient 
on inflation decreases from 0.129 to 0.108 and the coefficient Oll finilncial intermediation 
from -0.459 to -0.133. Stock turnover carries again a significant positive coefficient 
similar to the result presented of the first base specification (cf. Table 5.1). The amollnt 
of private credit divided by GDP as a mensure of the level of debt of private firms 
carries the expected negative sign: Higher clebt ratios weaken the power of ernlJloyees 
in the bargaining process over wa.ges and affect wages and thus labor shares negatively. 
Interest revenues as a percentage of balance sheet total do 110t systematically affect 
labor shares: the estimatcù coefficient indicates a negative effect, but the coefficient is 
not statistically significant and relativel)' srnall. Finally, claims OIl the private sector are 
only weakly linked to labor shares whcre the effcct is cO\lIlterintuitive. Other variables 
accoullting for the performance of the banking sector do not yicld significant results, 
either. 7 
The last specification (cf. column Summary) includes both labor market indi­
cators and financial measures that have proven interesting before. The base variables, 
union power, trade and private credit are robust to variations of tlte variables incluued. 
Stock turnover and interest income do not turn out to be robust to the inclusion of 
alternative variables. This specification results in the strongest coefficient for inflation 
and a weaker coefficient on financial intermediation. 
7We ~csted for the profi~ margin (defined in seNion 4.2.2), relaLive operaLing costs (opera~ing 
cos~s devided by total assetsl. bank income (llet imerest and non-interes~ income divided by total 
a~sets). Data stems from the OECO Bank Profitability Database, Income Statemcnt analysis. 
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5.3 Summary and Interpretation of Results 
The most important results can be surnmarized as foll ows8: 
i) Inflation is a positive and significant determinant of labor shares. Il can be 
argued that inflation causes fixed costs of priee adjustments to increase. Morcovcr, 
mark-up pricing on the basis of llistorical cos{.s lowers fea[ mark-ups when inflation is 
high. Il is thus a negative determinant of profits. High inflation rates during the 70s 
might have negatively affected profits which arc accounted for in capital shares. During 
the 90s, inflation decreased due to new objectives in monetary policy. Disinflation ill 
turn favoured profits. t.hus causing labor shares to decreasc. It is important to notiee 
that the cause-effect relationship might run in the opposite direction: firms facing higher 
costs due to high real wages respond with increasing priees. 
To get an idea of the quantitative importance of the positi ve coefficient of inflation, 
\Vith an estirnated coefficient of about 011.5 the decrcase il} the average inflation rate 
from about 12.3 % (1980) to an average of 1.5 % (1998) can account for a decrease 
in the a\wage labor share of 1.242 pereentage points. rVIoreover, as for the European 
specificaLiüll, the estirnated coefficient of 0.189 with a decrease in the average European 
inflation rate from about 10.2 % (1980) to an average of 1.3 % (1999) can account for a 
decrease in the average labor share of 1.678 perccntage points. The qualitative results 
are consistent with previous findings (cf. Alcala, 2000) 
ii) Financial intermediation equally proves to be an important factor in the de­
termination of labor shares. As expected, the increase of financial interrnediation call 
in part explain shrinking wages and labor shares. The rise in financial intermediation 
during the 1980 might be interpreted as a result of the deregulation of t.he banl<ing 
sector. Improved access of firms to debt financing might have strengthened the position 
of employers in the process of rent splitting. Perotti and Spier (1993) for instance argue 
8The interpretation is based on the coefficients cstirnateu in the CLS with fI-" specification 
because it seellls to rnost appropirately capture the fcal ures of our analysis. 
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that the increased reliance on debt financing might be used as an effective bargaining 
tool in the deterrnination of the wage: firms can argue that investrnent is necessary to 
pay future wages. Firms might then convincingly threaten that they will not invest in 
new projects unless the union agrees to reduce wages. There rnight thus be an impor­
tant link between the financial structure on wages. which translates into a link between 
financial structure and labor shares. 
A negative coefficient of 0.722 implies that the increase in average financial inter­
rnediation in value added from 2.30% (1970) to 4.40% (1993) can account for a dccrcase 
in average labor shares of 1.520 percentage points. Again, the effect on European coun­
tries is stronger: A negative coefficient of 1.129 irnplies that the increase in average 
European financial intcrmediation in value addcd from 2.34% (1970) to 4.24% (1992) 
can account for a decrease in average labor shares of 2.145 percentage points. The 
stronger effect for the European subgroup seems to SllppOl't t.he idea that the effect 
of banking deregulation should be bigger, given that the banking sector \Vas relatively 
deregulated in Anglo-Saxon countries to stal't with. 
iii) Globalization is a negative and statistically significant de termina nt of labor 
shares. The opening up of national to international markets resulted in higher interna­
tional competition in labor rnarkets.Research on the potential effects of globalization 
on labor markets argues that increased globalization increases the elasticity of labor 
demand and thus weakens employee power. This should result in a smaller surplus that 
is allocated to employees in the bargaining process of ernployees and employers over 
wages and thus in sm aller labor sharcs. 
The estimated coefficient of -0000506 irnplies that the increase of the trade-to­
GDP ratio from an average of 33.3 (1980) to 623 (2004) can explain the decrease in 
a.vera.ge labor shares of 1.467 percentage poi nts. The coefficient seems to be quali tativel)' 
robust to alternative specifications. Running the regression on European countries only 
results in a slightly weaker coefficient. The results are comparable with previous find­
ings: Harrison (2002) calculates a weak but statistically significant negative impact of 
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several globalization measures on labor shares. 
il') Labor market indicators have ambiguous effects on labor shares. The rigidity 
of labor markets should be expected to be a positive determinant of labor markets, as 
it has been argued in previous work. The coefficient on union density seerns t.o support 
tbe idea that employee power protects wagcs and labor shares in the short run: the 
estimated positive coefficient of 0.108 irnplies that the decrease of union membership 
l'rom an average of 44.4% (1978) to 313% (2001) can explain the decrease in labor 
shares of 1001 percentage points. 
Alternative measures of labor market characteristics yield however ambiguous 
results. Labor market. fiows, being associated \Vith labor market flexibility, are posilivel}' 
related ta labor shares. One possible argument is tha.t high flexibility might encourage 
firms to employ more labor. The coefficient is however Ilot robust which we attribute 
ta the paal' data availability reducing the panel ta an unsatisfactory small sarnpJe. 
Unfortunately a nurnber of la.bor market illdicators do not yield significant results 
at ail, which might be explained by the lack of time series data that adequately describes 
the development of labor markets. YVe cannat conclude that indicators such &'3 the 
minimum wage have no effect on labor shares. 'l>/e rather argue (itat the nature of these 
indicators makes them unsuitable for panel regressions: the ratio of the minimum wage 
to the avera.ge wage for instance does not vary considerably avel' time and time series 
are available for nine countries only. Employment protection legislation sirnilarly seems 
ta be an important determinant of wages, a.nd th us labor shares. However, constructed 
time series indicators va.ry little over time and do not yield significant results. 
v) Finally, alternative measures of the financial sector partiy confirm the results 
summarized in ii). Net interest incarne pel' GDP carries the expected sign (-0.001), 
where the effect is diminutive and not statistically significant. The measure of private 
credit equally implies negative effects on the labor share, the effect being quite weak 
as weil (-0.010). The coefficient is however statistically significant and relatively robust 
to alternative specifications. Stock turnover is positively correlated with labor shares, 
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where the effect is "veak but statistically significant. The result is roughly consistent 
with theoretical work by Perotti and Spier (1993). The authors argue that high equity 
financing at the detrirnent of clebt financing wcakens the power of employers in the 
bargaining process over wages which might allow employees to keep wages, thus labor 
shares, high. 
Coming back to our original qm:stion, we wanted to explain why we observe 
such differences in the development of labor shares after 1980, in particular why labor 
shares in Europe seern to constantl)' shrink but remain relativel)' constant in Anglo­
Saxon countries. Our results indicate that financial intermediation can partly help 
to explain the puzzle. The share of financial intermediation in value added increased 
more significantly in European countries, which we associate with the deregulation 
of the banking sector in Europe. To the extent that the financial sector has been 
relatively deregulated to start with in Anglo-Saxon countries, it thus makes sense that 
the coefficient for financial intermediation is stronger for the European subsarnple (1.129 
versus 0.722 for ail countries). 
Although inflation and trade are important deterl1linants of labor shares, they 
do not help to explain the distinct development of labor shares across countrics: bath 
Anglo-Saxon and European countries have experienced a period of double-digit inflation 
and subsequent disinflation; bath country groups face increasing competition due tü 
globalization and rising trade-to-GDP ratios. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE MüDEL 
The empirical results found III the previous section can be backed up with a 
simple general equilibrium mode!. To abstract from short term movements and to 
concentrate on the equilibrium values of labor shares for difIerent lcvels of credit market 
imperfections, wc use the general equilibrium model with endogenous wages presented 
by \iVasrner and Weil (2004). The model incorporates imperfections in both capital and 
labor markets which can be investigated about their impact on factor shares. We will 
not go into detail but gi\·e a short summary and concentrate on the application to this 
thesis. Please refer to Wasmer and Weil (2004) for more details on the mode!. 
The economy consists of three agents: entrepreneurs, banks and workers. En­
trepreneurs l and banks interact the capital market and entrepreneurs and workers in 
the labor market. Matching of workers and entrepreneurs in the labor market and of 
entrepreneurs and banks in the capital market, respective!y, are modeled symmetri ­
cally: agents are matched with certain probabilities constituting search and matching 
frictions; matching takes time and is costl)'. Both credi t and labor marl<et imperfections 
turn out to affect the outcorne of fact.or shares. In what fol1ows, the matching process 
and the equilibrium values of factor priees are determined, respectively. Simulation and 
comparative statics are used to determine the impact of market imperfections on factor 
shares. 
lThe terms "firrn" and "entrepreneur" will be used interchangeably. 
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6.1 The Matching Process 
The matching process ill the labor market is constructed similarly ta that in 
Pissaridies (1988). Firms find an unernployed worker (U) for their posted vacancy (V) 
at a rnatching probability q(8). The probability depends negatively on the labor market 
tightness (from the point of view of entrepreneurs) () = U: the more entrepreneurs are 
posting vacancies, the tighter the labor market, the Jess probable is a match «(/(8) < 0), 
the longer it will take for the firm to find a worker on average. 
The matching process in the credit market is symmetric to that in the labor 
market. Entrepreneurs (E) are looking for a financier (E) and are matched with a 
matching probability p( 0) where cP denotes the tightness of the capital market (from 
t.he point of view of entrepreneurs): r/J = ~. Again, the probability depends negatively 
on the state of the credit market, i.e. pl(ep) < O. The more entrepreneurs are looking for 
a financier, the tighter the market, the less probable the match from the entrepreneur's 
poillt of vie\\' 1 the longer the entrepreneur will look for a banker on average. 
Entrepreneurs st.art by searching a financier at a flow search cost c which is paicl 
out of their pocket. Financiers dispense a Aow search cost k looking for an entrepreneur. 
Once they found each other (with probability p( r/J)), they adopL a contract stipulating 
that the bank will finance the recruitment process of the firm and that the finn pays p 
to the bank in exchange, once it is producing output. p is determined in a bargaining 
process. The entrepreneur finally looks for a worker at a flo\\' seMch cost "( whieh is 
financed by the bank. Once the entrepreneur found a worker (with probability q(8)), 
they determine the wage w in a bargaining process, start producing an exogenously 
detcrmined output y and pay the bank p for as long as the firm operates. Finally, firms 
are destroyed at an exogenous rate s. 
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6.2 Rent Splitting 
Both the entrepreneur-bank relation as weil as the entrepreneur-worker match 
result in a gain for each party. The total surplus of each relation is split according to 
the relati\"c bargaining power of each agent in this process. Let ex be the bargaining 
po\ver of workers in the work contract and /3 be the bargaining power of banks in the 
financial contract. 
Entrcpr·eneurs and Banks 
Entrepreneurs and banks benefit from exchanging capital. The splitting rule of 
total surplus is determined by Nash bargaining over the total surplus of their relationship 
and can be shown to result in 2 
p = ,60 (y - w) + (1 -/3o)(r + s) q~)" (6.1 ) 
The equilibrium rentaI rate is a weighted average of the output of the firm net 
of wages y - w and banks' opportunity cost, that is the cost of financing the recruiting 
process costing Î for on average of q(~) periods. Weighting corresponds to the relati\"e 
bargaining power of the two parties. 
The effective bargaining power of banks /30: = l-a0-IJ) depends on the bargaining 
power of workers in the wage contract because bankers and entrepreneurs anticipate the 
wage contract when bargaining over the repayment rule. 
Entrepreneurs and Workers 
Similarly, both workers and entrepreneurs gain from the match and split their 
total surplus according to Nash bargaining. The resulting wage can be shown to be3 
2~ee Wasmer and Weil (2004) for more details. 
3 sec Wa~mer and Weil (2004) [or more details. 
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W = Cie (y - p) + (1 - Œe)b (6.2) 
whcre b denotes unemployment benefits. The wage is thus a weighted average of output 
net of repayments ta the bank y - p and the workers outside option b. The effcctive 
bargaining power of workers Œe = CiTr~~ss++:2dr~) increases with bargaining power. 
6.3 Equilibrium 
In cquilibrium, the tightness of the capital market can be shawn to be 
(6.3) 
Ta be able ta track the effects of our key pararneters on employrnent we follow 
,Vasrner and V/eil (2004) in llormalizing thc mass of workers to l, so that 1L denotes 
both the number of unemployed and the uncmployment rate. In equilibrium inflows 
into unemployment and outAows out of unernployment equalize: 
5(1 - u) = eq(e)u. (6.4) 
Solving for the equilibri um unemployment rate yields u' = eq(t)+s' or, for em­
ployment (1 - :ur = e:1dfls' The complete set of equations that describcs the mode] is 
given in the append ix Cl 
6.3.1 The Share of Labor, Capital and Financial Intermediation 
Labor shares 
In this model the remuneration of labor is the number of workers times the wage 
rate w. Total remuneration of labor is thus (1 - u)w. Ta be consistent with our data, 
labor shares should include not only net wages, but also supplements to wages. which 
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amount to contributions to unemployment benefits in the mode!. Paid out uncmploy­
ment benefits, i.e. ub, should equaJ contributions to unemployment benefits. Total 
rernuneration of ernployees thus arnounts to (1 - u):.J + ub. 
To calculate labor shares, we divide remuneration of \vorkers by output. Gross 
output amounts to y times the number of firms which is equal ta the nurnber of workers 
(each entrepreneur is matched with one worker): (1 - u)y. Deducting search costs of 
entrepreneurs for workers l'V and search costs of banks for entrepreneurs kB gives us a 
net output of Y = (1- u)y -l'V - kB. 4 The caJculation of costs is given in the appendix 
C2. The labor share is thus 
LS= (l-u)w+ub (65)(l-u)y-;V-kB· 
Oapital shares 
The capi tal share in our data corresponds to the share of entrepreneurs' profi ts in 
total value added in the mode!. Profit pel' entrepreneur arnounts to output net of factor 
costs y - p - w; profits of ail entrepreneurs producing output to (y - p - w) (1 - 'Il). 
Taking into account contributions to unemployment benefits, which are, in addition to 
net wages, paid by entrepreneurs, we have 
(y - p - w) (1 - 'Il) - ub 
CS = . (6.6)(1 - u)y - '"l'V - kB 
Share of financial intcrmediation 
The part of financial intermediation in output amounts to banks' income p(l - 'Il) 
net of search costs ')'V + kB divided by output: 
BS= (l-u)p-I'V-kB (6.7)(l-u)y-[V-kB 
1 We do not deduct search costs of entrepreneurs for bankers cE b(":luse the cost represents a 
nonmonctary effort of the entrepreneur. 
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6.4 Calibration and Simulation 
6.4.1 Calibration 
Our calibration of the mode! is close to that in Wasmer and \iVeil (2004) for the 
model with exogenous wages. The interest rate T is set to 0.05, output is normali2,ed to 
1. The separation rate s is 0.15 which corresponds to an average life tirne of firms of 6.67 
periods. Instead of setting bargaining power 0' and (3 ta 0.5, we set thcm ta t and t,. 
respectively, because the model with endogenous wages implies that effective bargaining 
powcr, which rnatters for the outcome of wages and repayments, is strict!y higher than 
0' and (3. \Ve set costs c and k ta 0.5 sa that search cost·s turn out to represellt a 
weak fraction of gross output. \Ve folio"\' Wasmer and \Vei! (2004) in parametrizing the 
rnatching functions q(e) = qoG-Tt and p(cjJ) = Po</J-€. The elasticities of the matching 
functions Tl and E: are kept at 0.5, respectively. 'liVe calibrate the level paramet.ers Po 
and qo sa that the outcomes of shares and the unemployment rate are realistic. We set 
unemployrnent benefüs b to 0.1 so that the)' are in a realistic proportion ta equilibrium 
wages. 
Table 6.1 Calibration and Equilibrium Values 
0'=1/5 .0=0.5 Capital share 31.8951 
/3=1/6 Tl=0.5 Labour share 62.1007 
c=0.5 s=0.15 Bank share 6.00422 
k=0.5 r=0.05 Unemployment rate 5.56325 
y=l Po=3 Wage rate 0.341805 
b=O.l qo=1.5 Repayment rate 0.473727 
Parame ter values and equilibrium va.lues are summarized in table 6.1. The bank 
share cames close to values of financial intermediation in value added we calculated in 
the empirical part of the thesis (section 4.22). The model produces capital and labor 
shares that realistically refiect shares in national output. 
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6.4.2 Comparative Statics 
In the following we investigate how an increased probability of matching in the 
capital market and the variation of the bargaining power of banks and workers, respec­
tivel}', affect labor and capital market outcomes. 
6.4.2.1 Improved financial conditions p(c/» 
A more efficient capital market fo!lowing financial liberalization for instance not 
only affects the capital market itself but also labor market variables like the wage and 
the labor share. An improved financial system can be modeled b}' an increase in the 
probability of matching p(ljJ) at any level of capital market liquidity q;. 
The improved financial environment encourages bath entrepreneurs and ban]<ers 
ta enter the market, so that the equilibrium credit market tightness 1jJ* stays put (cf. 
6.3). However, the entry of entrepreneurs slackens the labor market, e increases and 
the probability of finding a worker q(e) with now more entrepreneurs in the market 
decreases. This means that the entrepreneurs will take more time on average to find 
a \vorker. Since il. becomes more castly for hanks to finance the recruiting stage, this 
boosts the repayment of entrepreneurs to banks p, p depends negatively on the matching 
probability q(e) (cf. 6.1). The wage w in turn depends on the previously determined 
repayment p : the higher the repayment of the entrepreneur ta the bank, the sma!ler 
the total surplus that is split between workers and entrepreneurs and thus the wage. 5 
The increase of e can be shown ta increase the effective bargaining power of workers, 
ng, which mitigates the decrease of wages. Last, the increase of e boosts employment 
(1 - u) due to new entrepreneurs in the mar ket 6 
oNote that the rentai rale p and the wage rate w depend on each other which reinforccs the 
initial effect of a decreased matching probability q(e): the increase of w further decreases p, which 
increases w etc. 
6Thi~ follow$ from the equilibrium condition 6.4. 
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Figure 6.1 Comparative Statics (Po) 
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Labor shares 
decrease due to improved financial conditions as the wage decreases (cf. 6.5). 
There are however sorne secondary factors: first, the increase of employment (1 - u) 
slightly contributes to decreasing labor shares as output increases more importantly than 
workers' remuneration. Second, the entry of entrepreneurs and banks into the market 
increases search costs ('yV and kB) \vhich decreases output net of costs, mitigating the 
decrease of the labor share. 
This result corresponds to our empirical findings on the effect of financial devel­
opment on the labor share: a negative coefficient implies that financial intermediation 
has a negative impact on labor shares. 
Capital shares 
increase due to improved financial conditions. First, entrepreneurs' profits in­
crease due to lower wages. This increase is mitigated due to higher repayments ta the 
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bank (cf. 6.6). Second, the enlargement of employment (1- u) slightly increases capital 
shares. Third, the entry of banks and entrepreneurs and associated search costs kB 
and vacancy posting costs Î'V decrease output net of costs which still increases capital 
shares. 
Financial intermediation 
in value added should intuitively increase due to improved financial conditions: 
the upturn of repayments directly amplifies the part of banks in output (cf. 6.7). 
We observe however again sorne secondary effects: first, increased employrnent (1 - u) 
slightly adds to increasing the share of banks in total output. Second, increased search 
costs of banks kB and vacancy posting costs ,V decrease net output "vhich slightly 
decreases the part (lf hanks in total output. 
6.4.2.2 Higher bargaining power of workers (a) 
Ta understand the logic of the repercussions of higher a, it is important ta notice 
that there are two mechanisms by which a affects the outcorne of wages and repayments. 
First, higher bargaining power of workcrs irnproves workers position in the deterlilination 
of the wage contract and naturally increases wages directly, as effective bargaining 
power CXD increases with bargaining power CX (cf. 6.2). Second, endogenous wages are 
anticipated in the financial contract and thus also affect the relative effective bargaining 
power of banks and entrepreneurs: (30: depends positively on the bargaining power of 
workers. The higher the bargaining power of workers, the higher the bargaining power 
of financiers. 
Better prospects on a high wage ind uce more workers to enter the market w hich 
slackcns the labor market (8 dccreases). Consequently, entrepreneurs will find it easier 
to hnd a worker, the probability q(8) increases. A higher bargaining power of workers 
also increases the effective oal'gaining power of financiers. This attracts more financiers 
into the market inducing the credit market tightness slacken, equilibrium credit market 
tightness decreases (cf. 6.3) and the prospects for an entrepreneur to find a financier 
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p(cil) increase. Financiers will have to finance the recruitment stage for a shorter period, 
so that entrepreneurs will repay less (p decreases with increasing q(B)). The increasing 
effective bargaining power (30: however counteracts tlll' initial decrease of p. Increasing 
output net of repayments to the bank will, additionally to increased bargaining power, 
increase wages. We should note again that the slacker labor market will reduce effective 
bargaining power which rnitigates the direct increase of w due to 0:. Last, the inflow of 
unemployed pushes the employment rate (1 - u) down. 
Labor shares. 
The improved situation of workers should, logically, increases labor shares. The 
increase of wages directly works on labor shares (cf. 6.5). Sorne secondary effects con­
tribute tojrnitigate the positive impa.ct of increased bargaining power on labor shares 
First, decreased employment reduces both output and total remuneration of worJ<ers, 
which turns out to further increase the labor share. The exit of entrepreneurs however 
reduces \'acancy posting costs IV, slightly boosting output net of costs, thus reducing 
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the labor share. 
Some changes in the European labor market might support the idea that workers' 
bargaining power has decreased in the last decades. In particular, wc can observe a 
decline of union participation, a number of pro-firm reforms on the labor market and 
higher competition on the labor market due to globalization. These factors translate 
into a weaker a in the model, thus potentially explaining the decrease ol' the labor share 
since 1980. The theoretical results coincidc with empirical findings: the decrease in 
unionization has been found to be a robust determinant of shrinking labor shares (cf. 
page 45). 
Capitat shares 
Again, opposing forces detcrmine the outcomc of capital shares. Our simulation 
shows that the decrease of capital shares due to increased wages (cf. 6.6) overplays the 
increase due to lower repayments. Two minor factors contriuute to rcducing capital 
shares: first, decreased emp!oyment acts ncgatively on capital sharcs. Second, the 
outftow of entrepreneurs lowers vacancy post.ing costs ~fV which slightly increases output 
net of costs, reducing capiti:tl shares. 
Financial intermediation. 
The position of banks deteriorates with increasing bargaining power of workers as 
the decrease of the repayment ra.te directly decreases shares of financial interrnediation 
(cf. 6.7). Inc:reased effective bargaining power of banks however rnitigates the latter 
effect.. Sorne secondar)' effects add to the interplay of opposing forces: fi rst, the exi t of 
entrepreneurs and the associated decrease of vacancy posting costs ~iV sljghtly increases 
the share of banks. Second, the decrease in employment (1 - 'U) turns out to slightly 
decrease the share of financial intermediation 
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6.4.2.3 Higher bargaining power of banks (;3) 
Greater bargaining power of banks forces up concessions to the bank, leaving 
warkers and entrepreneurs with less surplus to share. '0/e should thus expect labor 
shares to fall. 
In more det.ail, higher bargaining power attracts bankers into the market, equilib­
rium credit market tightness ç* decreases (cf. 63). Bankers see their effective bargaîning 
power ;30. increased and force up repayments p of entrepreneurs (cf. 6.1). Entrepreneurs 
are in turn discouraged to enter the market because prospective profits are smaller due 
to higher repayments to the bank. The ratio of vacancies to llnemployed escales down 
and it is easier to find a worker (q(D) increases), making it less expensive for banks ta 
fi nance the recrlli ting process, counteracting the upt urn of p. Smaller ou tpn t net. of 
rcpayments to the bank will reduce the wage rate. \\le should again consider the effect 
of the slaclœr labor market on effective bargaining power of workers: in equilibriurn, a 
decrease of labor market tightness dccreases ae. This efTect contributcs to reclucing the 
wage rate. Last, the employment rate is a positive function of labor market tightness 
e: employment (1 - u) decreases slightly. 
The impact on factor shares can now be derived: 
Labor skaTes 
decrease as the wage rate is the main inRuential factor. Tlle exit of entrepreneurs 
and associated shrinking vacancy posting costs IV con tribu te to the decrease of labor 
shares. Two less important effects mitigate the decrease of labor shares: first, the entry 
of banks into the market slightly increases costs kB, thus decreasing net output and 
rising the labor share. Second, the decrease of employment exerts some upward pressure 
on labor shares. 
The model thus replicates the intuition that greater bargaining power of banks 
should negatively affect the labor share. 
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Capital shaT'es 
are again subject ta opposing forces. Simulation results show that capital shares 
decrease with rising (3 as entrepreneurs 100se bargaining power in the deterrnination of 
the repayment rate. Higher repayrnents reduce the profit of entrepreneurs, thus pushing 
capital shares down. At the same time, reduccd wages improve the financial situation 
of entrepreneurs, slightly counteracting the downwards trend of capital sharcs. Once 
again, the inflow of bankers into the rnarJœt slightly rises the capital share whereas the 
inflow of entrepreneurs and associated higher vacancy posting cosLs l'V decrease capital 
shares. Last, the downturn of employment additionally slightly reduces capital shares. 
Financial inteT'mediation 
in value added is, intuitively, increasing in the bargaining power of bankers. The 
upturn of repayments bave a direct positive impact on the share of banks in total output 
(cf. 6.ï). The outflow of entrepreneurs decreases vacancy posting costs l'V which pushes 
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the share of banks further up. Two less important factors exert downward pressure 
on the share: first, the inRow of bankers in the market and second the downturn of 
employment. 
CONCLUSION 
One central que"tion al. the origin of this thesis was to verify wh ether financial 
market imperfections can contribute to explain movements in labor shares. We find 
both ernpirical and theoretical evidence that not only labor market characteristics but 
also the leveJ of financial intcrmediation plays an important role in the determinacion of 
factor shares. As for the empirical analysis, we find that financiaJ intermediation has a 
strong negative and significant effect on labor shares. Our panel data study on 15 major 
OECD countries finds evidence that the performance of the capital market affects the 
position of employers in the bargaining over rent splitting and therefore affects wages 
and labor shares. The deregulation of the banking sector and oUler irnprovements in 
capital mar.kets such as technical innovation might thus be seen as factors contributing 
to shrinking labor shares in Europe. Furtltermore, wc find that infiation is a robust dc­
terminant of labor shares. Inflation is associated with low investment and thus shrin1<ing 
capital shares. Employment protection legislation "hould further play an important role 
in the determination of factor shares. Due to a lack of intcrternporal data, we proxy em­
ployment protection legislation by a number of labor market indicators. Labor market 
indicators yield ambiguous empirical results: One the one hand, inflexible labor markets 
characterized by high unionization for instance can account for high labor shares, on the 
other hand, there is evidence that inflexible labor market systems discourage the em­
ployment of labor and thus reduce labor shares. Sorne indicators such as replacement 
rates or the minimum wage yield non significant or ambiguous results. We argue that 
the poor results for this category of variables rnight be explained by the limited quality 
of these indicators: they do not cover al! countries, nor are they available for the w hole 
time horizon. Sample size is th us unsatisfactory smal! and poor estimation results do 
not surprise. Globalization seems to increase competition and force down wages, thus 
contributing to shrin1<ing labor shares. 
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Empirical results might be extended into various directions: First, regressions 
might be broadened down to industry level to see whether capital market imperfections 
affect sorne industries more than others. Samuel Bentolila and Gilles Saint-Paul (2003) 
for instance regress industry-country labor shares on a number of country-industry spe­
cific variables and country specific variables. Adding the ind ustry dimension augments 
the rtumber of observations and yields insights into the dytlamics of làbor shares within 
industries and their determinants. 
Empirical findings are backed up with a general equiliGrium model including 
search and matching frictions in both capital and labor markets. Varying the degree 
of capital market imperfections in the fonn of the matching probability enlightens the 
dynamics by which credit market imperfections affect factor shares. What is more, the 
mode! reAects how a decrease in workers' bargaining power results in decreased labor 
shares. Last, variations of the level of bargaining power of banks can contribu te ta ex­
plaining movements in factor shares. The model can however not be usee! to corroborate 
the impact of inAation on labor shares. Further research should aim at including money 
and inAation in the model to give an appropriate mirror image of ernpirical results. 
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APPENDIX B 
TABLES 
Table B.l ADF Statistic on Labor Shares, Gerrnany 
Nul! Hypothesis: LSWOF _DEU has a unit root 
t-Statistic Prob. * 
ADF test statistic 0.744950 0.9915 
Test critical values: 1% level -3.632900 
5% level -2.948404 
10% lpvel -2.612874 
*IvIacKinnon one-sided p-values. 
Table B.Z ADF Statistic on First difference Labor Sharcs, Gerrnany 
Nul! Hypothesis: D(LSWOF _DEU) has a unit root 
t-Statistic Prob. * 
ADF test statistic -4.770239 0.0005 
Test critical values: 1% level -3.639407 
5% level -2.951125 
10% level -2.614300 
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sidecl p-values. 
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Table B.3 Summary Statistics Labor Shares 
Data Horizon Obs. Mean Maximum ]\'Iinimum Stcl. Dev. Stationari ty 
ACS 1970-2001 32 0.523903 0.616609 0.457310 0.049307 1(1) at 1% 
AliT 1970-2005 36 0.554114 0.617246 0.489393 0.033360 1(1) at 1% 
BEL 1910-2004 35 0.562955 0.620403 0.524144 0.030091 1(1) at 1% 
CAN 1970-2004 35 0578003 0.660687 0505597 0.041825 1(1) at 1% 
DNK 1970-2005 36 0582115 0624005 0.521531 0028831 1(1) at 1% 
DEU 1970-2005 36 0590698 0.638135 0.538057 0.029543 1(1) at 1% 
ESP 1970-2004 35 0526667 0568124 0.495484 0.021896 1(1) at 1% 
FI.\] 1970-2003 34 0576882 0.631491 0.506462 0036368 1(I)atl% 
FRA 1970-2004 35 0.540154 0.599873 0.481421 0042510 1(I)atl% 
JPN 1970-2005 36 0.525814 0.582783 0.469368 0.037199 1(1) at 1% 
NOR 1970-2003 34 0.514199 0.562018 0.454529 0.026596 1(I)at.1% 
UK 1970-2004 35 0563618 0.627291 0515000 0036293 1(I)atl% 
1TA 1970-2003 34 0525323 0.605006 0.432917 0046625 1(1) at 1% 
NLD 1970-2005 36 0625170 0.72-5907 0.552595 0.047395 1(1) at. 1% 
USA 1970-2004 35 0507925 0.562765 0.451471 0.036394 1(1) at 1% 
Table BA Summary Statistics: Financial Intermediation 
Data horizon Obs. Mean Maximum Minimum Std Dev. Slatiollari tv 
AUS 1989 - 2004 16 0064788 0075425 0.050869 0.007577 1(I)at1% 
AUT 1976 - 2003 28 0038928 0049021 0031227 0.004749 1(1) at 1% 
BEL 1995 - 2001 7 0041570 0.045416 0.034455 0003948 1(1) at 1% 
CAN 1980 - 2001 22 0.048118 0.058705 0.038155 0.006250 1( 1) at 1% 
DNK 1970 - 2001 33 0032773 0041293 0023366 0004772 1(1) at 1% 
DEU 1970 - 2003 34 0037300 0.047037 0.029972 0.003630 1(1) at 5% 
ESP 1995 - 2001 7 0.043043 0046472 0.040669 0002045 1( 1) at 1% 
FIN 1975 - 2004 30 0.029445 0040285 0022413 0.004274 1(1) at 1% 
FRA 1978 - 2003 26 0.038094 0045328 0.031189 0.004210 1(1) at 1% 
JPN 1970 - 2002 33 0.032773 0.041293 0023366 0.004772 1(1) at 1% 
NOR 1996 - 2004 9 0060045 0.066589 0.054870 0.004695 1(I)at1% 
UK 1970 - 2003 34 0.028297 0040119 0.014199 0.006065 1(I)atl% 
ITA 1097 - 2003 34 0.034227 0055540 0021587 0.008268 1(1) at 1% 
NLD 1992 - 2003 12 0035216 0.043450 0.026991 0005673 l( 1) at 1% 
USA 1987 - 2003 17 0.070097 0.080621 0059525 0007004 l(l)atl% 
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Table B.5 Sumrnary Statistics: Inflation 
Data horizon Obs. Mean ~Iaximum Minimum Std. Dev. Stationari ty 
AUS 1970-2005 36 0.063031 o154762 0002144 0.041395 1(1) at 1% 
AUT 1970-2005 36 0.037826 0095368 0.005144 0022687 1(1) at 1% 
BEL 1970-2005 36 0.042955 O.J 29032 0009424 0.031281 1(1) at 1% 
CAN 1970-2005 36 0.048725 0.123377 0.001115 0.033610 1(1) at 1% 
DNK 1970-2005 36 0.031406 0.070388 -0001361 0.019538 1(1) at 1% 
DEU 1970-2005 36 0.054480 0.154545 0012150 0.038441 1(1) at 1% 
ESP 1970-2005 36 0.085618 0.241135 0.018319 0.058724 1(1) at 1% 
FIN 1970-2005 36 0.057039 0178114 0001871 0.047685 I(1)at1% 
FRA 1970-2005 36 0053497 0.136986 0.005112 0.041960 1(1) at 1% 
JP~ 1970-2005 36 0.080956 0.210526 0.016684 0.059567 1(1) at 1% 
NOR 1970-2005 36 0034620 0.231845 -0.008953 0.048354 I(l)atl% 
lJK 1970-2005 36 0038389 0.102625 -0.007905 0.027639 I(1)at1% 
lTA 1970-2005 36 0056529 0136571 0.004655 0.036046 I(1)at1% 
NLD 1970-2005 36 0070303 0240741 0.015674 0.055196 I(1)at1% 
USA 1970-2005 36 0047950 0.137767 0.016094 0.029879 I(1)at1% 
Table B.6 Surnrnary Statistics: GDP Growth 
Data horizon Obs. Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Stationarity 
ACS 1970-2005 36 5.581787 6.1;)2333 5.055902 0331722 1(1) at 1% 
AUT 1970-2004 35 4678910 5.564903 3328627 0.668673 1(0 ) 
BEL 1970-2004 35 4.878843 5.772686 3.575151 0.647751 1(1) at 1% 
CAN 1970-2004 35 5.945870 6.910751 4.516339 0.710101 1(1) al 1% 
DNK 1970-2004 35 6,945332 7.766375 5.681196 0.644839 1(1) al 1% 
DEU 1970-2004 35 4,316740 5.150397 3.135494 0.607373 I(1)at1% 
ESP 1970-2004 35 5937917 6.994667 4.532599 0.706754 I(1)at1% 
FIN 1970-2005 30 4.463250 4.926123 3.946057 0.272860 I(1)at1% 
FRA 1970-2004 35 6,615427 7,516216 5.278115 0.669217 I(l)atJ% 
JPN 1970-2004 35 6,557098 7.384114 5.234312 0.660879 I(1)at1% 
NOR 1970-2005 36 8,127007 8.516019 7.498318 0,312531 I(1)al1% 
UK 1970-2004 35 5,295013 6.229694 3994524 0.669703 I(1)at1% 
ITA 1970-2005 36 4,698306 5.219198 4.051333 0.344752 1(1) at 1% 
NLD 1970-2004 35 6552958 7.539559 5.305789 0.662683 I(1)al1% 
USA 1970-2004 35 8,331530 9.365565 6,932448 0,733064 I(1)at1% 
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Table B.ï FE Regression results: Specification in Levels 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-S tatist ic Prob. 
C 0.173882 0.032319 5.380213 0.0000 
LSWOF _(-1) 0949557 0.047433 20.01900 0.0000 
LSWOF _ (-2) -0.171491 0.045309 -3.784888 0.0002 
LOG(GDP _) -0.070264 0.022785 -3.083808 0.0022 
LOG(GDP _(-1)) 0061382 0.021432 2864096 0.0045 
FI -0.104689 0055431 -1.888624 0.0599 
INF 0.130535 0.019016 6.864551 0.0000 
\Veighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.984853 
Adjusted R-squared 0.983840 
Durbin- Watson stat 1823996 
Unweighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.984192 
Sum squared resid 0.026985 
Durbin-Watson sta.t 1771723 
Dependent Variable: LSWOF _ ? 
lVlethod: Pooled EG LS (Cross-section weights) 
Effects Specification: Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
Sample (adjustcd): 1971 2003 
IncJuded observations: 33 arter adj ustments 
Cross-sections included: 15 
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 332 
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors and covariance 
APPENDIX C 
THE MüDEL 
C.I System of Equations 
The system in equilibrium is described by eighL equations: 
cf = 1 - (3Q ~ (C.1) 
(3Q C 
5(1 - u) = qOB1-"1u (C.2) 
r + s + B1-"1 
0:0=0:. (C.3)
r + 5 + o:(}l-7j 
(3 = (3 (CA) 
Q 1-0:(1-(3) 
W = 0:0 (y - p) + (1 - o:o)b (C.S) 
Î' p = (30 (y - 'W) + (1 - (3cJ(r + 5)----=1] (C.6) 
k 
POC;;1-é = 
_c_ = 
PocP-é 
(30(1-0:0) qoB-"1 (Y-b qo() Î')
1 - o:e(3Q r + qOe-"1 s + r - qoB-TJ (C.7) 
(1 - (30)(1 - 0:0) qoB-TJ (y - b __Î'_) (C.8) 
. 1 - oo,BQ r + qoB-TJ s + r (joB-TJ 
The unknowns are w, P, O:f), (3(t' " u, cP and B. 
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C.2 Calculation of Costs 
To calculate output net of costs, we calculate the number of vacancies and bankers. 
The number of vacancies can be obtained directly from the definition of labor market 
tightness e= t, thus V = eu. Vacancy posting costs arnount to IV = ,eu. 
Second, we need to determine the stock of bankers B searching for an entrepre­
neur. We first determine the number of entrepreneurs in stage 0 that are searching for 
a financier, say EO In equilibrium the stock of entrepreneurs EO is constant so that 
inAows into the pool of EO is equa! to outftows. The number of inl10ws is the nUlYlber 
of firms that split up at a rate 5, ie. 5(1 - 11). The number of outftows is equal to the 
nllmber of entrepreneurs that find a financier, i.e. p(ep)Eo VVe havc 
-p(4))EO + 5(1 - u) 
o 
==> E O = 5 (1 - u) 
p(q;) . 
We can now determine the number of ban1<ers via the definition of credit market tight­
ness, B = EO /4>, which gives us 
B = 5(1 - u) 
rPp( cP) . 
